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Courts should be reluctant to apply the literal terms of a statute to 
mandate pointless expenditures of effort. . .. Unless Congress has 
been extraordinarily rigid, there is likely a basis for an implication of 
de minimis authority to provide exemption when the burdens of 
regulation yield a gain of trivial or no value.1 
It seems bizarre that a statute intended to improve human health 
would .. . lock the agency into looking at only one half of a 
substance's health effects in determining the maximum level for that 
substance.2 
[I]t is only where there is "clear congressional intent to preclude 
consideration of cost" that we find agencies barred from considering 
costs.3 
In order better to achieve regulatory goals - for example, to allocate 
resources so that they save more lives or produce a cleaner 
environment - regulators must often take account of all of a 
proposed regulation's adverse effects, at least where those effects 
clearly threaten serious and disproportionate public harm. Hence, I 
believe that, other things being equal, we should read silences or 
ambiguities in the language of regulatory statutes as permitting, not 
forbidding,' this type of rational regulation.4 
The rule-implicit valuation of a life is high - about $4 million - but 
not so astronomical, certainly by regulatory standards, as to call the 
rationality of the rule seriously into question, especially when we 
consider that neither Hepatitis B nor AIDS is a disease of old people. 
These diseases are no respecters of youth; they cut off people in their 
working years, and thus in their prime, and it is natural to set a high 
value on the lost years.5 
1. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
2. Am. Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
3. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
4. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 121 S. Ct. 903, 921 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
5. Am. Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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Risks never exist in isolation. They are part of systems. For that 
reason, any effort to reduce a single risk will have a range of 
consequences, some of them likely unintended. 
If the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") requires parents 
to purchase seats for children under three so as to make flying safer, it 
will also make flying less convenient and .more expensive, and thus 
lead some people to drive instead.6 Flying is much safer than driving, 
and hence the F AA's measures might ensure that more lives are lost 
on balance. If noise levels are reduced at the Grand Canyon, so that 
people can enjoy the area in peace and quiet, air tourism there will 
have to be dramatically reduced, so that fewer people can enjoy the 
area at all.7 If the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") requires 
aggressive corrosion control technologies to reduce lead· in water, it 
might thereby produce increases in other contaminants, because the 
very technologies that reduce lead can contribute to water pollution.8 
If the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") 
increases regulation of benzene, a carcinogenic substance, it might 
lead companies to use a less safe, or perhaps even an . unsafe, 
substitute; it might also decrease the wages of affected workers, and 
decrease the number of jobs in the relevant industry. People who have 
less money, and who are unemployed, tend to live shorter lives - and 
hence occupational regulation might, under certain circumstances, 
sacrifice more lives than it · saves.9 Of course the unintended 
consequences of risk regulation might be desirable rather than 
undesirable - as, for example, when regulation spurs new pollution­
control technologies. 
Now consider the following cases: 
1. The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to issue standards 
controlling any substance that "contributes significantly" to pollution 
problems in certain areas. EPA issues regulations governing relevant 
pollutants, but without considering the costs of compliance. Industries 
challenge the regulations on the ground that cost is a statutorily 
relevant factor.10 
2. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
("NHTSA") is asked to promote fuel economy in automobiles through 
fuel economy standards. The Coalition for Automobile Safety, a 
public interest organization, contends that the effect of certain 
6. See Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety and Security, 20 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 791, at 793 (1997). 
7. Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
8. Am. Water Works v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
9. See Symposium, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994). 
10. Compare Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding cost a 
permissible factor for the agency to consider under a similar statute), with Lead Indus. Ass'n 
v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding cost an irrelevant factor under provisions 
governing national ambient air quality standards). 
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proposed standards will be to lead manufacturers to produce smaller 
and more dangerous cars. The Coalition contends that NHTSA acted 
unlawfully in failing to take this effect into account.11 
3. A federal statute requires the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration to regulate toxic substances "to the extent feasible. "12 
OSHA interprets this language to require it to consider whether the 
regulation is technologically feasible and whether it is "practicable," 
economically speaking, for the industry to comply. OSHA imposes a 
regulation that is admittedly "feasible" under this test, but the 
regulation cannot pass a cost-benefit test because the benefits to 
workers are low, even trivial, and the costs are high. Insisting that costs 
must be compared with benefits and that high costs cannot be imposed 
for trivial gains, industries subject to the regulation complain that it is 
unlawful.13 
In which of these cases has the agency acted unlawfully? The 
question is of immense importance, both for regulatory policy and for 
the relationship between courts and agencies. One of my main 
purposes here is to demonstrate that federal law has now built a novel 
set of rules · for statutory construction: the cost-benefit default 
principles. In brief, these principles (1) allow de minimis exceptions to 
regulatory requirements; (2) authorize agencies to permit 
"acceptable" risks, departing from a requirement of "absolute" safety; 
(3) permit agencies to take account of both costs and feasibility; and 
(4) allow agencies to balance costs against benefits. Taken as a whole, 
the cost-benefit default principles are making a substantial difference 
to regulatory policy, both because of their effects in litigated cases and 
because of their systemic consequences for regulation.14 
At the same time, the cost-benefit default principles remain mostly 
the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 
Currently, it is not clear whether the Supreme Court will ultimately 
adopt them. I attempt to explain here why the principles make a good 
deal of sense and deserve general support. 
Even if broadly accepted, however, the default principles raise 
many questions. For the most part, the cost-benefit default principles 
say what agencies are permitted to do. It is not clear whether the 
default principles also mean that when statutes are ambiguous, 
agencies will be required to do any of these things. Nor do the 
principles give much indication of how agencies permitting 
"acceptable" risks, or engaging in cost-benefit analysis, might be 
expected to proceed. What does it mean to say that agencies are 
permitted to "consider" costs? Would it be unlawful for an agency to 
11. See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
12. 29 u.s.c. § 655(b)(5) (1994). 
13. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
14. See ROBERT v. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 425 (3rd ed. 
2000). I discuss below the important decision in Whitman v. American Trucking Association, 
531 U.S. 457 (2001), forbidding the EPA from seeking costs in issuing noticed air quality 
standards. 
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say that even very high costs are worth incurring? In what way should 
the monetary valuation of human life be constrained? What counts as 
an acceptable or de minimis risk? How should agencies deal with the 
interests of future generations? 
However these questions are resolved, there can be no doubt that 
the cost-benefit default principles have emerged as a central part of 
what amounts to the federal common law of regulatory policy. Of 
course most of that common law, including the incipient federal 
common law of cost-benefit analysis, will emerge, and is emerging, 
from regulatory agencies, which have to decide how much to regulate, 
and why.15 Here agencies are the principal architects of what shall be 
seen as a form of nonjudicial common law. But courts will 
undoubtedly play an important role,16 and it is in the interaction 
between agencies and judges that binding law will emerge. Among my 
largest purposes here is to understand the nature of the cost-benefit 
default principles, their legitimacy, and their future content.17 
There is a still more general point in the background. The steady 
emergence of the cost-benefit default principles signals the impending 
conclusion, in all branches of government,18 of a "first generation" 
debate over whether cost-benefit analysis is desirable.19 That debate 
appears to be terminating with a general victory for the proponents of 
cost-benefit analysis, in the form of a presumption in favor of their 
view (signaled above all, perhaps, by President Clinton's substantial 
endorsement of cost-benefit balancing via Executive Order).20 The 
"second generation" debates raise difficult questions about how (not 
15. Hence, for example, different agencies have come up with different dollar figures by 
which to value statistical lives; this is a central part of agency-made common law of cost­
benefit analysis. See the table in Matthew D. Adler & Eric A Posner, Implementing Cost­
Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1146 (2000). 
There are also striking variations in agency selection of discount rate, that is, the treatment 
of costs and benefits (such as lives saved) in the future. See Comment, Judicial Review of 
Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333, 1364-69 
(1998) (documenting variations ranging from 2% to 10%). These issues are treated below. 
16. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (striking 
down agency regulation of asbestos under statute calling for cost-benefit balancing). 
17. It is important to see that many federal agencies do not comply with the apparent 
requirements of cost-benefit balancing in existing executive orders. Robert Hahn has shown 
that compliance is episodic and that a great deal needs to be done to systematize the process. 
See Robert W. Hahn et al., Empirical Analysis: Assessing Regulatory Impact Analysis: The 
Failure of Agencies To Comply With Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARV J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
859 (2000). Here, as elsewhere, there is a large difference between law on the books and law 
in the world. I do not attempt here to address the important issue of how to ensure 
compliance with principles that call for attention to costs and benefits. But judicial review of 
agency action can serve as a partial corrective, ensuring that in the egregious cases, agency 
action will be held invalid for failure to comply with the principles. This point is discussed at 
several places below. 
18. Within Congress, see, for example, 5 U.S.C. § 1535 (1994); within the executive 
branch, see infra note 20. 
19. For discussion, see Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 
YALE L.J. 1981 (1998); Symposium, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and 
Philosophical Perspectives, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 837 (2000). 
20. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
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whether) to engage in cost-benefit analysis - how to value life and 
health, how to deal with the interests of future generations, how to 
generate rules of thumb to simplify complex inquiries, how to ensure 
that agencies do what they are supposed to do, how and when to 
diverge from the conclusion recommended by cost-benefit analysis, 
how to determine the roles of agencies and courts in contested cases. 
My identification and assessment of the cost-benefit default principles 
is intended as a contribution to these "second generation" debates. An 
especially important "second generation" question is when, if ever, the 
presumption in favor of cost-benefit balancing is rebutted. I attempt to 
make a start in answering that complex question. 
The Article is organized as follows. Part II traces the rise of cost­
benefit default rules in federal law. It begins with the emergence of 
cost-benefit principles, outlines statutory formulations, and then 
elaborates the default rules. Part III explores · the underlying 
considerations in some detail - what supports the use of default 
principles generally and these default principles in particular. In Part 
III, I address the general question of when the presumption in favor of 
the principles might be rebutted. Part IV turns to the question whether 
agencies should be required to do what the cost-benefit default 
principles permit them to do. Part V deals briefly with a set of issues 
that an agency must address if it is going to engage in cost-benefit 
balancing. Part VI is a brief conclusion. 
II. CONSIDERING AND NOT CONSIDERING COSTS 
A. From 1970s Environmentalism to the Cost-Benefit State? 
A Prefatory Note 
This Article does not attempt to resolve the broad question 
whether cost-benefit analysis is a good idea, or whether the many 
recent initiatives in that direction should be approved or modified.21 
But as background to an understanding of the cost-benefit default 
principles, a brief overview of the debate is in order. The rise of 
interest in cost-benefit balancing signals a dramatic shift from the 
initial stages of national risk regulation. Those stages were 
undergirded by what might be called "1970s environmentalism," which 
placed a high premium on immediate responses to long-neglected 
problems, which emphasized the existence of problems rather than 
their magnitude, and which was often rooted in moral indignation 
directed at the behavior of those who created pollution and other risks 
to safety and health.22 Defining aspects of 1 970s environmentalism can 
be found in the apparently cost-blind national ambient air quality 
21. For a range of perspectives, see Symposium, supra n.ote 19. 
22. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 13 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L . 171 (1988). 
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provisions of the Clean Air Act23 and in statutory provisions requiring 
that standards be set on the basis of "standards of performance" for 
which costs are a secondary consideration.24 
No one should deny that 1970s environmentalism has done an 
enormous amount of good, helping to produce dramatic .improvements 
in many domains, above all in the context of air pollution, where 
ambient air quality has improved for all major pollutants.25 Indeed, 
1970s environmentalism appears, by most accounts, to survive cost­
benefit balancing, producing aggregate benefits in the trillions of 
dollars, well in excess of the aggregate costs.26 The EPA's own 
estimates suggest that, as a result of the Clean Air Act, there were 
184,000 fewer premature deaths among people thirty years of age or 
older in 1990 - and also that there were 39,000 fewer cases of 
congestive heart failure, 89,000 fewer cases of hospital admissions for 
respiratory problems, 674,000 fewer cases of chronic bronchitis, and 
850,000 fewer asthma attacks.27 The EPA finds annual costs of air 
pollution control at $37 billion, hardly a trivial number, but less than 
4% of the annual health and welfare benefits of $1.1 trillion.28 Even if 
the EP A's own numbers show an implausibly high ratio, more 
conservative valuations of likely beneficial effects still reveal benefits 
far higher than costs.29 
More generally, the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") 
has, for the last several years, engaged in a full accounting of the costs 
and benefits of all regulation.30 The report shows that regulatory 
benefits, in the aggregate, exceed regulatory costs. While the 
government's own numbers should be discounted - agency accounts 
may well be self-serving - at least they provide a good place to start.31 
In its 2000 report, OMB finds total regulatory benefits ranging from 
$254 billion to $1.8 trillion, with total costs ranging from $146 billion to 
$229 billion, for net benefits ranging from $25 billion to $1 .65 trillion.32 
23. 42 u.s.c. § 7409(b) (1994). 
24. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)(A); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(l), 7412(d)(2), 7475(a)(4), 
7502(c)(l) (1994). 
25. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT EPA 455-56 (Richard D. Morgenstern ed,, 1997) 
[hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; Paul Portnoy, Air Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 77, 101-105 (Paul R. Portnoy & Robert Stavins eds., 
2000). 
26. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 25, at 455-56. 
27. Portnoy, supra note 25, at 102-03. 
28. Id. at 109. 
29. Id. at 113 (showing a benefit-cost ratio of three to one). 
30. Office of Management and Budget, Reports to Congress on the Costs and Benefits 
of Federal Regulations, available at http://www. hitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/index.html (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2001) [hereinafter OMB Reports]. 
31. For a valuable overview, see Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do The 
Government's Own Numbers Tell Us?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED (Robert W. 
Hahn ed., 1996). 
32. Office of Management and Budget, Charts for Report to Congress on the Costs and 
Benefits of Federal Regulations (2000), available at http://www. hitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/ 
2000fedreg-report.pdf [hereinafter 2000 OMB Report Charts], tbl. 4. 
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A more disaggregated picture is also encouraging. In the 
transportation sector, the benefits range from $84 billion to $110 
billion, with the costs from $15 billion to $18 billion, for net benefits of 
$66 billion to $95 billion.33 In the net, benefits range from $9 billion to 
$12 billion. Much of the uncertainty stems from uncertainty about 
environmental benefits and costs, producing a possible range from 
$73 billion in net costs to over $1.5 trillion in net benefits.34 
For most government action, however, the benefits do seem to 
exceed the costs.35 As especially good examples, consider the following 
regulations, all from recent years: 
TABLE 1 :  REGULAT IO NS YIELD ING NET BE NEF ITS 
Regulation 2000 (net 2005 2010 2015 
benefit s in 
million s of 
dollar s) 
Hea d impa ct 310-370 1,210-1,510 1,210-1,510 1,210-1,510 
prote ction 
Con servation 1100 1100 1100 1100 
re serve pro _gram 
Re stri ction on sale 9,020-9820 9,020-9820 9,020-10,220 9,020-9820 
an d di stribution of 
toba cco 
A cid rain control s 260-1900 260-1900 260-1900 260-1900 
Energy 330 330-360 510-580 440-500 
con servation 
stan dar ds for 
refri _gerator s 
New surf ace water 50-1,200 50-1,200 50-1,200 50-1,200 
treatment 
Emi ssion stan dar ds 0 110-1200 110-1200 110-1200 
for new hig hway 
heavy- duty engine s 
Di spo sal of PCB s 136-736 136-736 136-736 136-736 
Parti culate s 0 0 12,000- -20,000-
stan dar d 113,000 86,000 
But even though the overall picture shows no cause for alarm, a 
closer look at federal regulatory policy shows a wide range of 
problems. Perhaps foremost is exceptionally poor priority setting, with 
substantial resources sometimes going to small problems, and with 
little attention to some serious problems.36 There are also 
33. Id. 
34. See id. 
35. See id., tbl. 5. 
36. This is the theme of STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993). 
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unnecessarily high costs, with no less than $400 billion being 
attributable to compliance costs each year,37 including $130 billion on 
environmental protection alone.38 OMB's own report shows some 
disturbing numbers. For the next fifteen years, OSHA's methylene 
chloride regulation will have annual costs of $100 million and annual 
benefits of $40 million;39 a regulation calling for roadway worker 
protection has benefits of $30 million, but equivalent costs; the cost­
benefit ratio for airbag technology innovations seems bad, though 
there is uncertainty in the data;40 EPA's regulation for financial 
assurance for municipal solid waste landfills has monetized benefits of 
$0, but costs of $100 million, and this is expected for the next fifteen 
years.41 By way of general illustration, consider the following table,42 
all drawn from recent regulations: 
TAB LE 2: REGU LAT IONS FA ILING TO YIE LD NET BENEF ITS 
Regulation 2000 (net 2005 2010 2015 
benefits in 
mill ions of 
dollars) 
Ex posure to -60 -60 -60 -60 
methylene chloride 
Roadway worker 0 0 0 0 
protection 
Financial assurance -100 -100 -100 -100 
for munici pal solid 
waste landfills 
Pul p and pa per -150 to 0 -150 to O -150 to 0 -240 to 0 
eff luent guidelines 
Ozone standards 0 -235 to 240 -840 to 1190 -9,200 to -1000 
Child restraint -40 to 40 -40 to 40 -40 to 40 -40 to 40 
system 
Vessel res ponse -220 -220 -220 -220 
plans 
Nitrogen oxide -57 to 29 -57 to 29 -57 to 29 -57 to 29 
emission from new 
fossil fuel fired 
steam generating 
units 
37. Thomas D. Hopkins, The Costs of Federal Regulation, 2 J. REG. AND Soc. COSTS 5, 
25 tbl. 2 (1992). 
38. Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins, Regulatory Review of Environmental Policy, 8 
J. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 111 ,  1 19 n.l (1994). 
39. OMB 2000 Report Charts, supra note 32, tbl. 12. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
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These figures, based on the anticipated costs and benefits of each 
regulation adopted in a single year, show a less than coherent overall 
pattern,43 especially when table 1 is put together with table 2. 
According to one study, better allocations of health expenditures 
could save, each year, 60,000 more lives at no additional cost - and 
such allocations could maintain the current level of lives saved with 
$31 billion in annual savings.44 The point has been dramatized by 
repeated demonstrations that some regulations create significant 
substitute risks45 - and that with cheaper, more effective tools, 
regulation could achieve its basic goals while saving billions of 
dollars.46 
In these circumstances, the most attractive parts of the movement 
for cost-benefit analysis have been rooted not in especially 
controversial judgments about what government ought to be doing, 
but instead in a more mundane search for pragmatic instruments 
designed to reduce three central problems: poor priority setting, 
excessively costly tools, and inattention to the unfortunate side-effects 
of regulation. By drawing attention to costs and benefits, it should be 
possible to spur the most obviously desirable regulations, to deter the 
most obviously undesirable ones, to encourage a broader view of 
consequences, and to promote a search for least-cost methods of 
achieving regulatory goals.47 Notice that, so defended, cost-benefit 
analysis functions not only as an obstacle to unjustified regulation but 
also as a spur to government as well, showing that it should attend to 
neglected problems. If cost-benefit balancing is supported on these 
highly pragmatic grounds, it might well attract support from many 
different people with diverse theoretical commitments. 
In fact, the record of cost-benefit analysis, at least within the EPA, 
is generally encouraging.48 Assessments of costs and benefits have, for 
example, helped produce more stringent and rapid regulation of lead 
in gasoline, promoted more stringent regulation of lead in drinking 
water, led to stronger controls on air pollution at the Grand Canyon 
and the Navaho Generating Station, and produced a reformulated 
gasoline rule that promotes stronger controls on air pollutants.49 In 
these areas, cost-benefit analysis, far from being only a check on 
regulation, has indeed spurred governmental attention to serious 
problems. 
43. On the problem of incoherent regulation, see Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably 
Incoherent Judgments, STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002). 
44. Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost­
Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369 (1995). 
45. See JOHN GRAHAM & JONATHAN WIENER, RISK vs. RISK (1995). 
46. See, e.g., A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR (2000); Robert 
Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION, supra note 25, at 31, 35-55. 
47. For many examples, see ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 25. 
48. See id. 
49. See id. at 458. 
June 2001 Cost-Benefit Default Principles 1661 
Cost-benefit analysis has also led to regulations that accomplish 
statutory goals at lower cost, or that do not devote limited private and 
public resources to areas where they are unlikely to do much good. 
With respect to asbestos, for example, an analysis of benefits and costs 
led the EPA to tie the phase-down schedules to the costs of 
substitutes, and also to exempt certain products from a flat ban.50 With 
respect to lead in gasoline and control of CFCs (destructive of the 
ozone layer), cost-benefit analysis helped promote the use of 
economic incentives rather than command-and-control regulation;51 
economic incentives are much cheaper and can make more stringent 
regulation possible in the first place. For regulation of sludge, 
protection of farm workers, water pollution regulation for the Great 
Lakes, and controls on organic chemicals, cost-benefit analysis helped 
regulators produce modifications that significantly reduced costs.52 For 
modem government, one of the most serious problems appears to be 
not agency use of cost-benefit analysis, but frequent noncompliance 
with executive branch requirements that agencies engage in such 
analysis.53 
Of course cost-benefit analysis is hardly uncontroversial.54 Insofar 
as both costs and benefits are being measured by the economic 
criterion of "private willingness to pay," there are many problems. 
Poor people often have little ability, and hence little willingness, to 
pay, and some people will be inadequately informed and therefore 
show unwillingness to pay for benefits that would improve their lives.55 
In some circumstances, regulatory agencies should seek not private 
willingness to pay, but reflective public judgments as expressed in 
public arenas.56 Society is not best taken as some maximizing machine, 
in which aggregate output is all that matters. Sometimes a regulation 
producing $5 million in benefits but $6 million in costs will be 
worthwhile, if those who bear the costs (perhaps representing dollar 
losses alone?) can do so easily, and if those who receive the benefits 
(perhaps representing lives and illnesses averted?) are especially 
needy. Sometimes public deliberation, with its own norms and 
constraints, will reveal that government should proceed even if the 
costs exceed the benefits, measured in terms of private willingness to 
pay. 
In view of these problems, the strongest arguments for cost-benefit 
balancing are based not only on neoclassical economics, but also on an 
understanding of human cognition, on democratic considerations, and 
50. Id. at 458. 
51. Id. at 49-86, 131-169. 
52. Id. at 458. 
53. See Hahn, supra note 17. 
54. For a general challenge to quantification, see Heinzerling, supra note 19. 
55. See Adler & Posner, supra note 15. 
56. Many of these points are pressed in ELIZABETH ANDERSON, v ALUE IN ETHICS AND 
ECONOMICS (1993). 
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on an assessment of the real-world record of such balancing.57 Begin 
with cognition. People have a hard time understanding the systemic 
consequences of one-shot interventions.58 Unless they are asked to 
seek a full accounting, they are likely to focus on small parts of 
problems, producing inadequate or even counterproductive 
solutions.59 Cost-benefit analysis is a way of producing that full 
accounting. Ordinary people also have difficulty in calculating 
probabilities, and they tend to rely on rules of thumb, or heuristics, 
that can lead them to make systematic errors.6() Cost-benefit analysis is 
a natural corrective here. Because of intense emotional reactions to 
particular incidents, people often make mistakes in thinking about the 
seriousness of certain risks.61 Cost-benefit balancing should help 
government resist demands for regulation that are rooted in 
misperceptions of facts. The idea here is not that the numbers are all 
that matter, but that the numbers can inform public debate simply by 
providing relevant information.62 
With respect to democracy, the case for cost-benefit analysis is 
strengthened by the fact that interest groups are often able to use 
these cognitive problems strategically, thus fending off regulation that 
is desirable or pressing for regulation when the argument on its behalf 
is fragile.63 Here cost-benefit analysis, taken as an input into decisions, 
can protect democratic processes by exposing an account of 
consequences to public view. Of course, public deliberation might 
reveal that private willingness to pay greatly understates the actual 
benefits of the project at issue. Values will inevitably play a role in the 
characterization and assessment of costs and especially benefits,64 but a 
review of the record suggests that cost-benefit balancing leads to 
improvements, not on any controversial view of how to value the 
goods at stake, but simply because such balancing leads to more 
stringent regulation of serious problems, less costly ways of achieving 
regulatory goals, and a reduction in expenditures for problems that 
are, by any account, relatively minor.65 
57. I attempt to develop this point in Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000). In the same vein, see Allan Gibbard, Risk and 
Value, in VALUES AT RISK 94-112 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1986). 
58. See DIETRICH DORNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE (1997). 
59. Id. 
60. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 (Daniel 
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky eds., 1982); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, 
Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 
(1990). 
61. See George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk As Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267 (2001). 
62. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic (Aug. 2001) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.aei.brookings.org (hereinafter Sunstein, Arsenic]. 
63. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999). 
64. See id. 
65. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 25, at 455-76. 
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None of these points suggests that cost-benefit analysis is a 
panacea for the problems that I have identified. Everything depends 
on questions of implementation, and there are also hard questions 
about appropriate valuation, questions to which I shall return. It is 
possible that cost benefit balancing could provide a form of "paralysis 
by analysis," and thus prevent desirable regulations from going 
forward. I have emphasized that the numbers should not be decisive. 
Sometimes respect for rights, or concerns about irreversibility, justify a 
rejection of cost-benefit balancing.66 Interest groups will undoubtedly 
portray both costs and benefits in a self-serving manner. The central 
point is that cost-benefit analysis can be seen, not as opposition to 
some abstraction called "regulation," and not as an endorsement of 
the economic approach to valuation, but as a real-world instrument 
designed to ensure that the consequences of regulation are placed 
before relevant officials and the public as a whole, and intended to 
spur attention to neglected problems while at the same time ensuring 
that limited resources will be devoted to areas where they will do the 
most good. Thus understood, cost-benefit analysis promises to attract 
support from a wide range of people with diverse perspectives on 
contested issues - a promise realized in the apparently growing 
bipartisan consensus on some form of cost-benefit balancing in many 
domains of regulatory policy.67 An understanding of this consensus is 
an indispensable background for approaching the cost-benefit default 
principles. 
B .  Statutory Terms 
My emphasis here will be on the relationship between these points 
and judge-made default rules for statutory interpretation. But judge­
made rules have considerable overlap with approaches taken explicitly 
by Congress in statutes governing health, safety, and the environment. 
In fact there is undoubtedly an interaction effect between statutes and 
judge-made law, with default principles emerging from statutory 
formulations and vice-versa. Part of the argument for the cost-benefit 
default principles is that they do not reflect purely judicial 
policymaking; those principles fit well with explicit enactments in 
other areas of the law. In dealing with the role of benefits and costs, 
federal statutes tend to fall into the following categories. I order the 
statutes roughly in accordance with their treatment of cost-benefit 
balancing, beginning with those that most flatly reject it, and ending 
with those that unambiguously embrace it. 
1 .  Flat bans on consideration of costs. Some statutes, exemplifying 
1970s environmentalism, appear to forbid any consideration of cost. 
Perhaps the most famous example is the Delaney Clause, which for a 
long period prohibited food additives that "induce cancer in man or 
66. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
67. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
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animal. "68 In the face of that language, the government sought to 
permit additives that, while carcinogenic, created only the most 
miniscule risks of cancer - lower risks, in fact than those that would 
come from eating one peanut with the FDA-permitted level of 
aflatoxins every 250 days, and much lower risks than come from 
spending about seventeen hours every year in Denver (with its high 
elevation and radiation levels) rather than the District of Columbia.69 
Nonetheless, the Delaney Clause was taken to forbid any form of 
balancing.70 But a far more important example comes from the most 
fundamental provisions of the Clean Air Act, governing national 
ambient air quality standards.71 For a long time, the national ambient 
air quality standards set under that Act have been understood to be 
based on "public health" alone.72 The EPA's judgment is to be 
grounded only in benefits; the cost of compliance is irrelevant. 
2. Significant risk requirements. An alternative formulation is to 
require the agency to address only "significant" or "unacceptable" 
risks. On this view, risks that do not reach a certain level need not and 
perhaps may not be addressed. This is the prevailing interpretation of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, under both the toxic 
substance provisions and the more general provisions of the Act.73 A 
requirement of a "significant risk" falls short of cost-benefit analysis in 
the sense that it is entirely benefits-based; costs are irrelevant as such. 
Once benefits fall below a certain threshold, regulation is not required 
and in fact is banned.74 Once benefits rise above that threshold, 
regulation is permissible, even if the benefits seem low in comparison 
to the costs. 
3. Substitute risks and health-health tradeoffs. Some statutes 
require agencies to consider whether a regulation controlling one risk 
would, in so doing, create a substitute risk. If so, agencies are 
permitted to decline to regulate, or to regulate to a different point. 
These are clear statutory recognition of health-health tradeoffs, which 
arise when there are health concerns on both sides of the equation, 
from both more and less regulation.75 Many statutory "consideration" 
68. 21 U.S.C. § 376(b )(5)(B) (1994). 
69. Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
70. Id. 
71. 42 u.s.c. § 7409(b) (1994). 
72. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Union Elec. Co. 
v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (holding that EPA may not consider economic and 
technological feasibility when approving or disapproving a state implementation plan). The 
Supreme Court vindicated the standard in Whitman v. American Trucking Association, 121 
S. Ct. 503 (2001 ). See infra Part III. 
73. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); Int'! 
Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
74. American Trucking Association v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), appears to 
endorse this view for regulation of air pollutants, on the theory that an interpretation that 
would allow the EPA to pick any point it chooses would violate the nondelegation doctrine. 
75. See GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 45. 
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requirements76 have an unambiguous feature of this sort, for example 
by requiring agencies entrusted with reducing air pollution problems 
to take account as well of "non-air quality health and environmental 
impact and energy requirements."77 Here is an explicitrecognition that 
the EPA is allowed to consider the danger that a regulation that 
decreases air pollution will also create water pollution or some other 
environmental problem.78 The reformulated gasoline program takes 
this basic form,79 as does the provision governing emissions standards 
for new vehicles, which authorizes the EPA to examine "safety 
factors" as well as cost and energy issues.80 Thus the EPA is instructed 
to ask whether a program designed to reduce air pollution might 
thereby make cars more dangerous; if so, the EPA should reconsider 
the program. Under the fuel regulation program of the Clean Air Act, 
the EPA is not allowed to prohibit a fuel or fuel additive unless "he 
finds, and published such finding, that in his judgment such prohibition 
will not cause the use of any other fuel or fuel additive which will 
produce emissions which will endanger the public health or welfare to 
the same or greater degree than the prohibited item."81 The Toxic 
Substances Control Act similarly requires the EPA to take account of 
substitute risks.82 
4. Feasibility requirements. Some statutes require agencies to 
regulate "to the extent feasible" or "achievable."83 These expressions 
are far from transparent. But as generally understood, such statutes 
put the focus not on benefits but solely on costs, and on costs in a 
particular way. They forbid an agency from regulating to a point that is 
neither (a) technically feasible, because the relevant control 
technology does not exist, nor (b) economically feasible, because the 
industry cannot bear the cost without significant or massive business 
failures.84 The line between (a) and (b), usually treated as crisp and 
simple, is hardly that. Whether a requirement is technically feasible 
will usually depend on the level of resources that are devoted to it. In 
practice, (a) and (b) therefore overlap, with (b) serving as a separate 
category only on those occasions when even massive expenditure of 
76. 42 U.S.C. § 7429 (a)(2) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4)(B) (1994) (Safe Drinking 
Water Act). 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(l) (1994). 
78. See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (recognizing this 
point but also holding that EPA had unlawfully elevated these "consideration" factors). 
79. 42 u.s.c. § 7545(k)(l) (1994). 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A) (1994). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (c)(2)(c) (1994). 
82. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
83. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994) ("feasible"); 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a)(3)(A) (1994) 
("will be available"); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (1994) ("achievable"); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(l) 
(1994) ("has been adequately demonstrated"). 
84. See Nat'I Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2000); AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 
965 F.2d 962, 980 (11th Cir. 1992); Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 
508-09 (1981). 
1666 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1651 
existing resources cannot bring the technology into existence. 
Noteworthy here is the fact that, while a significant risk requirement is 
entirely benefits-based, a feasibility requirement looks exclusively at 
the cost side of the equation. Such a requirement is a "block" of 
excessively expensive regulation. 
5. "Consideration "  requirements. A large number of statutes ask 
agencies to "take into consideration" various factors, including cost, in 
addition to the principal factor to which the statute draws the agency's 
attention (such as clean air or water). The most common formulation, 
now standard, asks the agency to produce the "maximum degree of 
reduction" that is "achievable," after "taking into consideration [1] the 
cost of achieving such emission reduction, and [2] any [a] non-air 
quality health and environmental impacts and [b] energy 
requirements."s5 The basic idea here is that the agency is supposed to 
qualify the pursuit of the "maximum" achievable reduction by asking 
(a) whether the cost is excessive, (b) whether energy requirements 
would be adversely affected, and (c) whether the "maximum" 
requirement might create health and environmental harms by; for 
example, increasing water pollution though reducing air pollution. 
6. Cost-benefit requirements. Several statutes ask agencies to 
balance costs against benefits, mostly through a prohibition of 
"unreasonable risks," alongside a definition of "unreasonable" that 
refers to both costs and benefits. The most prominent examples are 
the Toxic Substances Control Acts6 and the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.s7 Under these statutes, the agency is 
required to calculate both costs and benefits and to compare them 
against each other. If the costs exceed the benefits, regulation is 
unacceptable. More recently, cost-benefit analysis has been mandated 
by the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments.ss Under the Act, the 
EPA is asked to conduct a careful risk-cost analysis and to back away 
from the maximum feasible level if the benefits of the stricter standard 
"would not justify the costs of complying the with the level."89 While 
Congress has thus far resisted efforts to impose a cost-benefit 
"supermandate" calling for a general decision rule based on cost­
benefit balancing,9° Congress has enacted legislation requiring 
assessment, and public disclosure, of costs and benefits of major 
85. 42 U.S.C. § 7429(a)(2) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4)(B) (1994) (Safe Drinking 
Water Act). 
86. 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (a) (1994). 
87. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1994). 
88. 42 u.s.c. § 300g-l(b)(3) (1994). 
89. 42 u.s.c. § 300g-l(b)(6) (1994). 
90. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 
48 STAN. L . REV. 247 (1996). 
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regulations.91 OMB itself has been required to produce annual 
accounting of costs and benefits.92 
In the abstract, the distinctions among these kinds of provisions 
should be clear enough. A statute that calls for consideration of 
substitute risks does not require cost-benefit balancing, because it is 
more narrowly concerned to ensure that risks (generally to health) do 
not increase on balance; under a statute calling for health-health 
tradeoffs, it is irrelevant that costs as such exceed benefits. A statute 
that requires that regulations be "feasible" is ordinarily taken to entail 
no comparison between costs and benefits, but a cost-focused inquiry 
into what industry is able to do. A statute that regulates "significant 
risks," by contrast, is ordinarily taken to entail no comparison between 
costs and benefits, but a benefit-centered inquiry into the magnitude 
of the risk to be addressed. 
Of course many open questions remain, and I will return to those 
questions in Part IV. Let us simply take this menu of options as the 
background for understanding the nature of the cost-benefit default 
rules. 
C. The Default Rules Identified: An Overview 
To understand the cost-benefit default principles, some 
administrative law is in order. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council,93 the dominant case in the area, sets out the familiar two-step 
inquiry for judicial review of agency decisions. The first question 
("Step One") is whether Congress has "directly decided the precise 
question at issue" - more simply, whether Congress has 
unambiguously either banned or required what the agency proposes to 
do.94 Under Chevron, agencies are generally permitted to construe 
ambiguous statutes as they see fit. Chevron creates a kind of default 
principle in favor of agency discretion. It follows that even without a 
specific cost-benefit default principle, agencies should be permitted to 
consider costs so long as the statute is ambiguous on the point. When 
Chevron is combined with a specific default principle, the overall 
lesson is exceedingly straightforward: agencies are permitted to 
consider costs when Congress has not said that they may not. 
Under Chevron, however, the issue is not finished upon a finding 
that Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue. 
It remains to ask whether the agency's interpretation of the statute is 
reasonable ("Step Two"). When the lower court in American Trucking 
Association held that the EPA was required to consider the benefits as 
well as the risks of a pollutant, it did so partly on the ground that the 
91. 5 u.s.c. § 1535 (1994). 
92. See, e.g., Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 105-61, 
§ 625, 111 Stat. 1272 (1998); Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 105-277, § 638(a), 112 Stat. 2681 (1999). 
93. 467 U.S. 837 (1994). 
94. Id. at 842. 
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agency's interpretation to the contrary was not reasonable (because it 
was, in the court's view, "bizarre").95 It is therefore possible that even 
if an agency's decision does not violate Chevron Step One (because 
the statute is ambiguous), it will nonetheless violate Step Two if the 
decision can be shown to be arbitrary or bizarre. But a decision to look 
at costs, or the health risks of regulation, would almost never fail Step 
Two. 
Under Chevron, then, the legal issue is simple if Congress has been 
clear. But in the face of statutory uncertainty, cases provide support 
for each of the following principles. For some of the principles, the law 
is more developed than for others, but each of the principles is an 
identifiable part of contemporary public law. 
- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be 
permitted to make de minimis exceptions to statutory requirements by 
exempting small risks from regulatory controls.96 
- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be 
permitted to balance the health risks created by regulation against the 
health benefits created by regulation.97 
- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be 
permitted to take costs into account in issuing regulations. In its 
current form, this principle means that when statutes are ambiguous, 
agencies will have the authority to consider costs as well as benefits.98 
- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be 
permitted to decline to regulate past the point where regulation would 
be economically or technologically feasible.99 
- Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be 
expected to balance costs against benefits in issuing regulations.100 
Now let us explore some details. 
D. De Minimis Exceptions 
1 .  · The Basic Idea 
In a series of cases, the D.C. Circuit has developed a principle 
authorizing agencies to make de minimis exceptions to regulatory 
requirements. The first case to suggest the possibility of de minimis 
regulatory exceptions was Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy.101 In that case, 
the agency banned acrylonitrile on the ground that it counts as a "food 
additive" because acrylonitrile migrates in small amounts from bottles 
95. Am. Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see supra text 
accompanying note 2 (quoting the lower court). 
96. See, e.g., Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
97. This principle appears to underlie American Trucking, 175 F.3d 1027. 
98. See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F. 3d 663, 667-79 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
99. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
100. See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
101. 613 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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into the drinks they contain. The Food and Drug Administration 
{"FDA") concluded that the ban was justified on safety grounds, a 
conclusion that the court found inadequately justified. But what is 
more important in the case is the general language with which the 
court remanded the case to the FDA. The court stressed that the 
agency had discretion to exclude a chemical from the statutory 
definition of food additives if "the level of migration into food . . .  is so 
negligible as to present no public health or safety concerns."102 
A related case presented the question of whether the EPA was 
permitted to make categorical exemptions under the Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration program of the Clean Air Act.103 Here the 
court spoke in more ambitious terms, showing considerable 
enthusiasm for de minimis exemptions. It announced that: 
Categorical exemptions may also be permissible as an exercise of agency 
power, inherent in most statutory schemes, to overlook circumstances 
that in context may fairly be considered de minimis. It is commonplace, 
of course, that the law does not concern itself with trifling matters, and 
this principle has often found application in the administrative context. 
Courts should be reluctant to apply the literal terms of a statute to 
mandate pointless expenditures.104 
In fact the court expressly connected this principle with the idea that 
the court should "look beyond the words to the purpose of the act" to 
avoid "absurd or futile results."105 In its broadest statement on the 
point, the court concluded that "most regulatory statutes, including the 
Clean Air Act, permit" de minimis exemptions upon an adequate 
factual showing.106 
Here, then, is an explicit recognition of agency authority to exempt 
de minimis risks from regulatory controls. The authority operates as a 
clear statement principle - no less, but also no more. Where Congress 
has unambiguously banned such exceptions, agencies are bound, and 
may not create de minimis exemptions even in compelling 
circumstances.107 
In the same vein, consider Sierra Club v. Department of 
Transportation.108 At issue was a statutory requirement that the 
Secretary of Transportation refuse to approve the "use" of significant 
public park land unless "the program or project includes all possible 
planning to minimize the harm to the park . . . resulting from the 
use."109 The statutory question was whether limited commercial jet 
landings in an airport in the Grand Teton National Park should qualify 
102. Id. at 955. 
103. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
104. Id. at 360. 
105. Id. at 360 n.89. 
106. Id. at 360. 
107. Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
108. 753 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
109. 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1994). 
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as a "use," in the face of a reasonable agency finding that the increase 
in flights would not result in a "significant" change in noise. The court 
found that the term "use" should be understood to authorize de 
minimis exceptions.11° There are many decisions in the same vein.111 
2. The OSHA Variation: Requiring De Minimis Exceptions 
A noteworthy variation on the basic idea of permitting de minimis 
exceptions can be found in the plurality opinion in Industrial Union 
Department, AFL-CIO v. AP!, known as the Benzene Case.112 What 
the plurality said represents a variation on the basic idea for two 
reasons. First, the plurality prohibited the agency to regulate trivial 
risks; it went well beyond permitting the agency to create exemptions. 
Second, the plurality's substantive standard was phrased not in terms 
of de minimis exceptions to regulation, but of limiting regulation to 
"significant" risks, and hence prohibiting regulation of risks not shown 
to be "significant." The second difference might or might not be 
important, because it is not clear whether risks that do not qualify as 
"significant" should be treated as de minimis, though this does appear 
to be what the plurality had in mind. 
The central issue in the case was whether OSHA had to show a 
"significant risk" in order to regulate a toxic substance (there, 
benzene). In arguing that it did not, the government pointed to the 
central provision, which says that in promulgating the relevant 
standards, the Secretary: 
[S]hall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent 
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will 
suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity, even if such 
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard 
for the period of his working life.11 3 
The statute's general definition of occupational safety and health 
standards says that these are standards "reasonably necessary or 
appropriate to provide safe or healthful places of employment. "114 
The key statutory language is the "no employee will suffer" phrase, 
which indicates that even if a toxic substance places only one or a few 
workers in jeopardy, OSHA must act to provide protection. Whatever 
the meaning of the obscure general definitional clause ("reasonably 
necessary or appropriate"), the more specific provision, dealing with 
110. Public Citizen, 831 F.2d at 130. The case is expressly understood in this way in 
Coalition on Sensible Transportation, Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
111 .  See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Sierra Club v. 
EPA, 992 F.2d 337, 343-45 (D.C. Cir� 1993); Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (suggesting that "the literal meaning of a statute need not be followed where the 
precise terms lead to absurd or futile results, or where failure to allow a de minimis 
exemption is contrary to the primary legislative goal"); Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 1541, 
1556-57 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
112. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
113.  29 u.s.c. § 655(b)(5) (1994). 
114. 29 u.s.c. § 652(8) (1994). 
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toxic substances, would appear to trump any contrary indications in 
the more general one. A straightforward interpretation of the 
statutory terms, urged by four justices on the Supreme Court, would 
seem to suggest that no significant .risk need be shown.115 Nonetheless, 
a plurality of the Court rejected OSHA's argument to this effect and 
hence rejected OSHA's interpretation of the statute. 
In holding that a "significant risk" must be shown, the plurality 
contended that a contrary interpretation would defy common sense: 
"In light of the fact that there are literally thousands of substances 
used in the workplace that have been identified as carcinogens or 
suspected carcinogens, the Government's theory would give OSHA 
power to impose enormous costs that might produce little, if any, 
discernible benefits. "116 Though the plurality left undecided the 
question whether the agency must also show a reasonable · proportion 
between costs and benefits, it is clear, from the passage just quoted, 
that the "significant risk" requirement was motivated partly by the 
desire to ensure some kind of proportionality between benefits and 
costs, on the theory that the requirement serves to protect against the 
most egregious disproportions.117 
In American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan,118 
however, the Court emphasized what it saw as the ordinary meaning 
of the word "feasible" in order to hold that OSHA was not required to 
engage in cost-benefit balancing. In the Court's view, the agency's job 
is to ensure that all regulated risks are "significant." Once a significant 
risk is shown, the agency is required to regulate to the point where 
compliance would no longer be "feasible," in the sense of 
practicable.119 The fact that a regulation violated a cost-benefit test is 
neither here nor there. This holding raises many questions, to which I 
will return.12° For the moment the key point is that the Court's 
interpretation of OSHA builds on the idea that de minimis ·exceptions 
are permitted to reach a conclusion that insignificant risks may not be 
regulated at all. 
3. A Hazardous Waste Wrinkle: No Benefits, No Regulation 
In an important case involving hazardous wastes, the court of 
appeals aggressively interpreted the Clean Air Act so as to prohibit 
EPA from imposing regulation without a showing that the regulation 
would actually clean the air. Chemical Manufacturers Association v. 
EPA 1 21 involved an unusual rule requiring hazardous waste 
1 15. Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
1 16. Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 617. 
1 17. Id. 
118. 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
1 19. Id. at 496. 
120. See infra Part VI.A. 
121. 217 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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combustors to comply with new emissions standards. The EPA 
established a bifurcated compliance schedule: combustors would have 
three years to modify existing facilities and processes to come into 
compliance with the standards, but if they decided on "early cessation" 
and found that it was not cost-effective to make the required changes, 
they would be required to cease burning hazardous waste entirely 
within two years. 
At first glance, the EP A's program seems to make a great deal of 
sense. Those attempting to make expensive changes should receive a 
longer period for compliance than those refusing to make such 
changes. But EPA itself acknowledged that those who chose "early 
cessation" would actually redirect hazardous waste to other "facilities 
to be burned under essentially the same conditions."122 Thus, the early 
cessation rule would have no significant beneficial effects on 
hazardous waste or on hazardous waste pollution. "It will instead 
merely reallocate which combustion facilities process the same 
hazardous waste under the same conditions. "123 The court held that in 
these circumstances, the rule was unlawful, because it would not 
promote the purpose of the Act, which was to clean the air. In the 
court's view, it is simply unreasonable "to impose costly obligations on 
regulated entities" without showing that those obligations would help 
to promote the Act's environmental goals.124 "Given the absence of 
environmental benefits - indeed, the possibility of environmental 
harm," the rule could not be valid.125 
Chemical Manufacturers Association is a striking application of the 
principle that regulation should be expected to deliver significant 
benefits. The court seems to be urging that agencies will not be 
permitted to require expensive activity without a showing that the 
expense will produce nontrivial environmental gains. An issue 
involving interest-group pressure seems to lurk in the background 
here: commercial waste incinerators, intervenors in the case, stood to 
gain a great deal from the rule (because it would transfer business to 
them), and we may speculate that the court feared that the EPA was 
issuing a regulation, nominally based on environmental grounds, that 
would favor a well-organized private group with an economic stake in 
the outcome.126 
E. Substitute Risks 
Extensive attention has recently been given to the problem of 
"risk-risk" or "health-health" tradeoffs, which arise when regulation of 
122. Id. at 865. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 867. 
125. Id. 
126. Cf Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981) 
(discussing alliance between environmentalists and eastern coal companies). 
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one health problem gives rise to another health problem.127 Suppose 
that more stringent fuel economy standards for new cars, justified 
partly on environmental and thus health-related grounds, would have 
the effect of leading automobile manufacturers to produce smaller and 
more dangerous cars, thus resulting in a significant loss of life in 
accidentsY8 Is the agency entitled to take this effect into account? Or 
suppose that the FDA is asked to require genetically engineered foods 
to be labeled as such; if the labels would lead consumers to switch to 
less safe substitutes, such as certain kinds of organic foods,129 may the 
FDA take that effect into account? Or suppose the FAA is asked to 
require children under the age of three to have their own seats in 
airplanes. The regulation might be urged on the ground that it would 
prevent a number of injuries in the air and also produce protection in 
the event of a crash. In the abstract, it is reasonable to think that 
children will be helped as a result. But suppose that a consequence of 
the mandatory purchase of a seat would be to lead many parents to 
drive rather than fly, on the ground that flying has suddenly become 
significantly more expensive. It is possible that the overall 
consequence of the proposed FAA rule would be that more children 
will die. Is the FAA permitted to take this effect into account? 
Recent cases suggest an emerging principle of interpretation, in the 
form of a strong presumption in favor of permitting (and even 
requiring) agencies to take account of substitute risks, and hence to 
undertake health-health tradeoffs. In American Trucking Association, 
for example, it was argued that while ground-level ozone creates 
certain health risks, it also produces certain health benefits, above all 
because it provides protection against skin cancer and cataracts.130 The 
EPA responded that it lacked authority to consider the risks created 
by regulation or, to put the point slightly differently, the health 
benefits of an air pollutant. 131 
Taken on its own, the statutory text might seem to support the 
EPA's view, or at least to make that view a reasonable interpretation 
of ambiguous terms. The statute provides that ambient standards must 
be based on "criteria" documents, which are supposed to include "the 
latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of 
all identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be 
expected from the presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, in 
varying quantities."132 EPA urged, plausibly, that the phrase 
"identifiable effects" of "such pollutant" was meant to refer to the 
adverse effects of the "pollutant," not to its beneficial effects. But the 
American Trucking court concluded that the statute could not be 
127. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 9. 
128. See supra note 11. 
129. See ALAN MCHUGHEN, PANDORA'S PICNIC BASKET 201-29, 232-237 (2000). 
130. 175 F.3d 1027, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
131. Id. at 1051-52. 
132. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (1994). 
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interpreted in that way.133 In a passage that suggests a strong 
presumption in favor of health-health tradeoffs, the court said (not 
entirely convincingly) that the statute was unambiguous, and (far more 
convincingly) that the "EPA's interpretation fails even the 
reasonableness standard . . .  : it seems bizarre that a statute intended to 
improve human health would . . .  lock the agency into looking at only 
one half of a substance's health effects in determining the maximum 
level for that substance."134 What is most striking about this suggestion 
is that the court seems to have gone beyond the view that the agency is 
permitted to engage in health-health tradeoffs if it chooses, and to 
require the EPA to do so even if it would choose otherwise. 
Or consider Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA,135 where 
the plaintiffs challenged fuel economy standards precisely on the 
ground that the agency had failed to take account of the adverse 
effects of such standards on automobile safety. In the face of an 
ambiguous statute, the court insisted that a full explanation was 
required for a decision that, in the abstract, would seem to create 
serious substitute risks.136 As a result of this decision, it is now the law 
that NHTSA must take into account any evidence of adverse safety 
effects in the process of setting fuel economy standards. On remand, 
NHTSA confronted the evidence and concluded that the alleged effect 
could not be demonstrated - a conclusion that the court upheld on 
appeal.137 What is important for present purposes is the clear holding 
that the agency is permitted and even obliged to consider health­
health tradeoffs in setting fuel economy standards. 
In some cases, judicial permission to consider substitute risks has 
done real violence to statutory language. Consider, for example, the 
EPA's approach to lead contamination in water. The Safe Drinking 
Water Act requires the EPA to produce maximum contaminant level 
goals ("MCLG") for water contaminants.138 These goals are required 
to "be set at the level at which no known or anticipated adverse effects 
on the health of persons occur," with an adequate margin of safety.139 
For lead, the EPA's MCLG was zero, because no safe threshold had 
been established. Once an MCLG is established, EPA is required to 
set a maximum contaminant level ("MCL"), "as close to the maximum 
contaminant level goal as is feasible. "140 The EPA is authorized not to 
set a maximum contaminant level, and to require "the use of a 
treatment technique in lieu of establishing" that level, only if it finds 
133. 175 F.3d at 1052. 
134. Id. 
135. 956 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
136. Id. at 324. 
137. Competitive Enter. Inst. v. NHTSA, 45 F.3d 481, 484-86 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
138. 42 u.s.c. § 300g-l(b) (1994). 
139. 42 u.s.c. § 300g-l(b)(4) (1994). 
140. 42 u.s.c. § 300g-l(b)(4) (1994). 
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"that is it not economically or technologically feasible to ascertain the 
level of the contaminant."141 
At first glance, this set of provisions has a familiar structure. The 
EPA is required to set a standard of performance, and is barred from 
requiring a "technique" for achieving the desired performance, unless 
it is not feasible to monitor water quality. For lead, then, we would 
expect EPA to set its MCL as close as "feasible" (economically and 
technologically) to the MCLG of zero, except if it was not "feasible" 
to ascertain the level of lead contamination through monitoring. But 
this is not what EPA did, because of some distinctive features of the 
lead problem. Source water is basically lead-free; the real problem 
comes from corrosion of service lines and plumbing materials. With 
this point in mind, EPA refused to set any MCL for lead, on the 
ground that an MCL would require public water systems to use 
extremely aggressive corrosion control techniques that, while 
economically and technologically "feasible," would be 
counterproductive because they would increase the level of other 
contaminants in the water. What appeared to be the legally mandated 
solution would make the water less safe, not more so. The EPA 
therefore chose a more modest approach. Instead of issuing an MCL, 
it required all large water systems to institute certain corrosion control 
treatments and demanded that smaller systems do so if and only if 
representative sampling found significant lead contamination. 
Did the EPA violate the Safe Water Drinking Act? At first glance, 
it seems that it did. The EPA did not contend that an MCL was not 
"feasible" to implement, nor did it argue that it was not "feasible," in 
the economic or technological sense, to monitor lead levels in water. 
Nonetheless, the court upheld the agency's decision.142 The court 
accepted the EPA's suggestion that the word "feasible" could be 
construed to mean "capable of being accomplished in a manner 
consistent with the Act." The court said that "case law is replete with 
examples of statutes the ordinary meaning of which is not necessarily 
what the Congress intended," and it added that "where a literal 
meaning of a statutory term would lead to absurd results," that term 
"has no plain meaning."143 Because an MCL would itself lead to more 
contamination, "it could lead to a result squarely at odds with the 
purpose of the Safe Drinking Water Act."144 The court therefore 
accepted EPA's view "that requiring public water systems to design 
and implement custom corrosion control plans for lead will result in 
optimal treatment of drinking water overall, i.e. treatment that deals 
adequately with lead without causing public water systems to violate 
drinking water regulations for other contaminants."145 
141. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(7)(A) (1994). 
142. Am. Water Works Ass'n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
143. Id. at 1270-71. 
144. Id. at 1271. 
145. Id. 
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It should be plain that the court permitted a quite surprising and 
even countertextual interpretation of the Act. The statutory terms 
seem to make no room for the EPA's refusal to issue an MCL. 
Nonetheless, the EPA's refusal made good pragmatic sense in light of 
the risks that would be introduced by any such regulation. The court's 
decision is probably the clearest example to date of an aggressive 
default rule allowing agencies to ensure that regulation does not 
introduce problems equivalent to those that it is attempted to solve. 
F. Consideration of Cost 
The presumption that agencies may "consider costs" has also 
emerged in a series of important cases within the. D.C. Circuit. In a 
period in which environmental factors seem to compete with economic 
considerations, many related to the supply of energy, these decisions 
have particular importance. Consider three examples. 
At issue in Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA146 was an 
FAA regulation designed to reduce noise from airplanes over the 
Grand Canyon. The statute required "substantial restoration" of the 
"natural quiet," which the FAA understood to require that the Park 
achieve 50% of the natural quiet at least 75% of the day. In refusing to 
impose stricter controls, the FAA explained that it took into 
"consideration of the needs of the air tour industry."147 From its 
ambiguous explanation, it appears that the FAA sought partly to 
protect the air tour industry as such, but mostly to protect tourists in 
their ability to see the Grand Canyon from the air. Not surprisingly, 
the FAA had been asked to impose both more strict and less strict 
regulation, and its decision was contested, by different parties, as both 
too strict and as excessively lenient. 
Those challenging the rule said that the F AA's task was to ensure 
"substantial restoration" of the "natural quiet," and that protection of 
the air tour industry was a statutorily irrelevant factor.148 The court 
responded by invoking something like a presumption in favor of 
considering cost, noting that nothing in the statute "forbids the 
government from considering the impact of its regulation on the air 
tour industry. "149 This passage is ambiguous, but the court appears to 
recognize that in the face of congressional silence, at least one kind of 
cost - that involving the air tour industry - will be within agency 
discretion to consider. The narrowest construction of the court's 
opinion is that statutes should not be taken to be self-defeating, so that 
the FAA is permitted to conclude that a statute designed to enable 
people to enjoy the Grand Canyon, by reducing noise, should not be 
implemented with regulation so strict as to disable people from 
146. 154 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
147. Id. at 475. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
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enjoying the Grand Canyon by air.150 A broader reading is that under 
ambiguous statutes, agencies will . be presumed able to take into 
account the costs of various implementation strategies.151 
Support for the broader reading comes from George E. Warren 
Corp. v. EPA,152 where domestic companies challenged the EPA's 
implementation of the reformulated gasoline provisions of the Clean 
Air Act. A central question for the EPA was how to treat foreign 
refiners and importers. In resolving that question, the EPA considered 
not only air quality benefits, but also the comments of the Department 
of Energy. That agency expressed concern that certain approaches 
could increase the price and decrease the quantity of gasoline by 
making it more difficult for foreign refiners to divert production to the 
United States in periods of increased demand.153 The EPA took this 
point expressly into account in its rule. The result was an outcome 
more favorable to foreign refiners, and less favorable to 
environmental protection or domestic competitors, than EPA might 
otherwise have chosen. Nonetheless, the court upheld the agency's 
decision, emphasizing the absence of an explicit legislative ban on 
consideration of these economic factors.154 The court appeared to 
suggest that an express congressional preclusion of economic factors 
would be necessary in order to make them irrelevant as a matter of 
law. 
By far the most explicit statement on point, however, comes from 
Michigan v. EPA.155 At issue there was an EPA decision to approve a 
state implementation plan ("SIP") for the regulation of ozone. The 
statutory term provided that SIPs must contain provisions adequately 
prohibiting "any source or other type of emissions activity within the 
state from emitting any air pollutants in amounts which will . . .  
contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with 
maintenance by; any other State with respect to any such national 
primary or secondary ambient air quality standard."156 At first glance, 
this provision might well be read as a kind of absolute ban on 
"significantly contributing" pollutants. But the EPA did not 
understand it that way. Instead the EPA reached a more subtle, even 
creative conclusion. It would adopt a low threshold for deciding 
whether a contribution was "significant." But the "significant 
contributors" would be required to reduce their ozone only by the 
150. Careful readers will notice that whether this conclusion is necessary to prevent the 
statute from being self-defeating depends on how the statute's purposes are characterized: if 
the purpose is to reduce noise for those visiting the Grand Canyon, an interpretation that 
would ignore the interests of the air tour industry would not be self-defeating at all. 
Unfortunately there is no simple purpose to be "found" behind this statute. 
151. This is how the case is read in Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
152. 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
153. Id. at 623. 
154. Id. at 619-20. 
155. 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
156. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1994). 
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amount achievable via "highly cost-effective controls,"157 meaning 
those that could produce large reductions relatively cheaply. In states 
with high control costs, then, relatively low reductions would be 
required. 
Apparently because of the clarity of the statutory language on the 
particular point, no one in the case argued that EPA was required to 
balance costs against benefits before issuing regulations. Challenging 
the EP A's interpretation, environmental groups urged that the statute 
banned any consideration of costs at all. In their view, "contribute 
significantly" made no room for an inquiry into the costs of 
compliance. The court rejected the argument, finding no "clear 
congressional intent to preclude consideration of costs."158 But the 
court obviously had a difficult time with the statutory terms 
"contribute significantly," which seem to refer to environmental 
damage, not to environmental damage measured in light of cost. In 
upholding the EPA's decision, the court insisted that significance 
should not "be measured in only one dimension," that of "health 
alone." In fact in some settings, the term "begs a consideration of 
costs."159 In the court's view, EPA would be unable to determine 
" 'significance' if it may consider only health," especially in light of the 
fact that ozone causes adverse health effects at any level. If adverse 
effects exist on all levels, how can EPA possibly choose a standard 
without giving some weight to cost?160 
But there is a serious problem for this conclusion. Taken together, 
the OSHA cases seem to argue in the opposite direction. As we have 
seen, the requirement that OSHA show a "significant" risk (a 
requirement imposed in the Benzene Case) has not been taken to 
mean that OSHA must or even may consider costs (with cost-benefit 
balancing apparently banned by the Cotton Dust Case161) .  To this the 
court responded that in the aftermath of those cases, OSHA has itself 
attempted to ensure, and invariably claimed, that the costs of safety 
standards are "reasonably related to their benefits."162 In any case "the 
most formidable obstacle" to a ban on consideration of cost "is the 
settled law of this circuit,"163 which requires an explicit legislative 
statement to preclude consideration of cost. Here, then, is an express 
judicial endorsement of a cost-benefit default principle, permitting 
agencies to consider costs if they seek to do so. 
We should see Michigan v. EPA as a close cousin to American 
Water Works.164 In both cases, the court of appeals permitted the 
157. 213 F.3d at 675. 
158. Id. at 678. 
159. Id. at 677. 
160. Id. at 678. 
161. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
162. Id. at 677. 
163. Id. at 678. 
164. See supra text accompanying notes 141-146. 
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agency to read the statutory text aggressively, on one view even to 
amend it, on the theory that the agency's approach was so much more 
sensible than the approach that would be required by textualism. It 
seems clear that the Congress that enacted the Safe Drinking Water 
Act could not foresee the special problems creating by removing lead 
from water, problems that the EPA plausibly argued would make a 
MCL counterproductive. So, too, for the nonattainment program. 
From every point of view, the EPA's effort to require only cost­
effective controls seemed better than an effort to define "contribute 
significantly" in a cost-vacuum. It is not clear whether the Supreme 
Court would approve the lower court's rejection of textualism in either 
case. But if we focus on Congress's inability to foresee the many 
complexities that arise in the context of implementation, we might well 
have sympathy for both decisions.165 
G. Feasibility 
Many statutes expressly require regulation to be "feasible."166 But 
what if the statute is silent or ambiguous on the question of whether 
agencies may impose regulations beyond the point of "feasibility"? 
Sometimes statutes are "technology-forcing," in the sense that they 
require companies to innovate, and thus to do more than what current 
technology permits.167 Often, however, the technology that is 'forced" 
by statutory requirements is entirely feasible - indeed, that is part of 
the reason that Congress requires it. In fact, some technology-forcing 
can be justified by cost-benefit principles themselves - if the benefits 
of forcing technology outweigh the costs, as they sometimes do. 
Companies might fail to innovate with respect to pollution control 
simply because they do not internalize all of the benefits of the 
innovation. But technological innovation is sometimes neither feasible 
nor justified by cost-benefit principles. Because of large costs, 
regulation will sometimes raise serious questions from the standpoint 
of feasibility, in the sense that it will drive many companies out of 
business or require technologies that are not now and cannot soon be 
made available. In such cases, the question is how to handle legislative 
silence. 
The question arose most prominently in Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. EPA ,168 involving the toxic substances provision of the 
Clean Air Act. That provision, since substantially revised,169 required 
EPA to issue regulations that would provide "an ample margin of 
165. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT, at 229-31 (1999) (discussing reasons for allowing agencies, but not courts, 
to depart from text in unanticipated cases). 
166. See supra note 83; see also supra notes 99, 113, 140 and accompanying text. 
167. For a general discussion, see D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal 
Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1977). 
168. 824 F.2d 1 146 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982)). 
1680 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1651 
safety to protect the public · health. "170 The principal question was 
whether cost was relevant to the EPA's judgment. On its face, the 
statute might seem to block any consideration of cost and, indeed, to 
require regulations that would reduce risks to zero, especially because 
for many toxic substances safe thresholds simply do not exist. Alert to 
this point, the EPA urged that it should be allowed to take feasibility 
into account in setting regulations. The court accepted this conclusion 
by suggesting that regulations could avoid "zero risk" in two ways. 
First, the EPA was required to make an initial, benefits-based, cost­
blind determination of what is "safe"; but citing the Benzene Case, the 
court said that "safe" did not mean "risk-free."171 Thus "the 
Administrator's decision must be based upon an ·expert judgment with 
regard to the level of emission that will result in an 'acceptable' risk to 
health."172 Of course, there is a degree of arbitrariness in any particular 
judgment here, especially if -the judgment is cost-blind. But the court 
apparently was attempting to guarantee a degree of visibility and 
consistency in agency decisions by ensuring that the "acceptable risk" 
judgment would be made publicly and would be followed in a range of 
cases. 
Second, the court said that in deciding how far to go beyond 
"safety," in order to provide an "ample margin," the Administrator 
was permitted to consider both costs and feasibility.173 It is clear that 
the court engrafted these ideas onto a statute that did not expressly 
include them. In this sense, the decision suggests an interpretive 
principle to the effect that a statute that is silent or ambiguous on the 
point will ordinarily be taken to permit the agency to take account of 
the feasibility of statutory commands. 
H. Costs and Benefits 
When will an agency be permitted to decide in accordance with 
cost-benefit balancing? In the face of statutory ambiguity, is an agency 
authorized to make such balancing the basis for decision? 
1. In General 
An affirmative answer was given in Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. EPA174 (the same title, but not the same case, as that just 
discussed). At issue in that case was the EPA's decision whether to 
classify a source of fugitive emissions as "major" within the meaning of 
a statutory provision calling for regulation of "major emitting 
facilities.175 The EPA concluded that it would not add certain 
170. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(l)(B) (1982), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (1994). 
171. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 1150-51. 
174. 937 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
175. 42 u.s.c. 7475 (1994). 
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industrial sources, including surface coal mines, on the ground that the 
social and economic costs of regulation would outweigh the 
environmental benefits.176 The statutory language did not require cost­
benefit analysis, and the court emphasized that an alternative 
construction was not barred by statutory language and legislative 
history.177 Nonetheless, the court said that it would treat the agency's 
interpretation as permissible in the face of legislative silence. 
Interpretation of OSHA has shown identical thinking. Outside of 
the area of toxic substances, the statute (with its opaque "reasonably 
necessary or appropriate" language) is ambiguous on whether cost­
benefit analysis may- be made the basis for decision. Here a court of 
appeals went out of its way to say that OSHA is permitted to decide 
on the basis of cost-benefit balancing if it wishes.178 In a challenge to 
the agency's lockout/tagout rule, the court .of appeals said that such 
balancing would be a permissible basis for agency decisions, and 
indeed seemed to suggest that this would be the court's preferred 
route.179 On reinand, the agency appeared to decline the court's 
invitation, choosing a test based largely on a mixture of the 
"significant risk" and "feasibility" requirements, a test that the court 
upheld.180 But the story does not end there. The agency has continued 
to say - perhaps to insulate itself from a court challenge - that it 
finds a "reasonable relationship" between costs and benefits, and in its 
most recent pronouncement on the issue, the court treated this as an 
authoritative constructive of the statute.181 It remains to be seen 
whether an OSHA regulation that is said not to show such a 
reasonable relationship might be challenged as unlawful. 
2. The TSCA Wrinkle 
A more aggressive ruling, with a statutory text more favorable to 
cost-benefit balancing, is . Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EP A .182 What 
makes this case a wrinkle is that, as in the Benzene Case, the court said 
not merely that the agency is permitted to follow an interpretive 
principle, but that it is required to do so. At the same time, the 
Corrosion Proof Fitting court's decision remains the most elaborate 
statement to date of the emerging federal common law of cost-benefit 
analysis. 
At issue was the EPA's attempted ban on asbestos, an admittedly 
carcinogenic substance, under the Toxic Substances Control 
Act ("TSCA").183 TSCA allows EPA to regulate "unreasonable 
176. Natural Res. Def Council, 937 F.2d at 643. 
177. Id. at 645. 
178. Int'! Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
179. Id. 
180. Int'! Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
181. See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
182. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
183. 15 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2692 (1994). 
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risks,"184 and it therefore invites some kind of cost-benefit balancing. 
But the court went far beyond what the statute unambiguously invited. 
In addition to allowing EPA to engage in cost-benefit balancing, the 
court required a high degree of quantification from EPA, including 
explicit comparisons of the cost-benefit ratios for different degrees of 
regulation, and also separate discussions of how regulation would 
affect different industries using asbestos.185 The court thus insisted that 
the EPA go beyond a comparison of "a world with no further 
regulation" and "a world in which no manufacture of asbestos takes 
place" to include as well cost-benefit comparisons under different 
approaches to regulation.186 
At the same time, the court objected not to the overall cost-benefit 
ratio, but to the cost-benefit ratios for some areas in which asbestos 
was to be banned: 
[T]he agency's analysis results in figures as high as $74 million per life 
saved. For example, the EPA states that its ban of asbestos pipe will save 
three lives over the next thirteen years, at a cost of $128-277 million ($43-
76 million per life saved) . . .  ; that its ban of asbestos shingle will cost $23-
34 million to save 0.32 statistical lives ($72-106 million per life saved); 
that its ban of asbestos coatings will cost $46-181 million to save 3.33 lives 
($14-54 million per life saved) . . . .  187 
With evident incredulity, the court said that the "EPA would have this 
court believe that Congress . . .  thought that spending $200-300 million 
to save approximately seven lives (approximately $30-40 million per 
life) over thirteen years is reasonable. "188 All in all, this is an aggressive 
use of the interpretive principle in favor of cost-benefit balancing. The 
court not only construes statutory text in a way that mandates such 
balancing, but also requires a demonstration that particular parts, and 
subparts, of the relevant regulation satisfy a cost-benefit inquiry.189 
Ill. A NOTE ON WHITMAN V. AMERICAN TRUCKING 
In a sense, the cost-benefit default principles were tested before 
the Supreme Court in Whitman v. American Trucking Association.190 
184. The term appears no less than thirty-five times in thirty-three pages of the statute. 
See William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the Owls and the Crows, 4 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 377, 379 (1989); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2605(a) (1994); 15 U.S.C. 2605(e)(2)(B) 
(1994). 
185. Corrosion Proof Fitting, 947 F.2d at 1205-07. 
186. Id. at 1216. 
187. Id. at 1222. 
188. Id. at 1223. 
189. See also Am. Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 825-26 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(upholding OSHA regulations designed to protect against hepatitis and AIDS, and noting 
that the "rule's implicit valuation of a life is high - about $4 million - but not so 
astronomical, certainly by regulatory standards, as to call the rationality of the rule seriously 
into question, especially when we consider that neither Hepatitis B nor AIDS is a disease of 
old people") (citation omitted). 
190. 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001). 
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In that case, the Court was asked to say that the EPA could consider 
costs in setting national ambient air quality standards. The Court 
refused the invitation, concluding that such standards must be set 
without regard to cost. The Court emphasized the evident clarity of 
the statutory provision at issue, which defined national standards as 
those "requisite to protect the public health."191 In context, the 
reference to "public health" seemed to require a cost-blind judgment, 
based on health alone. 
Does American Trucking throw the cost-benefit default principles 
into doubt? The simple answer is that it does not. The Court 
concluded that the Clean Air Act was unambiguous; it did not by any 
means suggest that an ambiguous statute would be taken to disallow 
consideration of costs. Indeed, the Court itself referred, with evident 
approval, to several of the decisions discussed here, suggesting that 
none of those cases involved a section sharing the "prominence" of the 
"requisite to protect the public health" provision.192 In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Breyer was careful to add that courts "should read 
silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory statutes" to 
permit consideration of "all of a proposed regulation's adverse effects, 
at least where those effects would clearly be serious and 
disproportionate. "193 Justice Breyer was clearly concerned that the 
Court's approach would permit consideration of costs only when 
Congress had been explicit on the point. But at first glance, Justice 
Breyer's concern seems baseless. The Court was saying only that in 
view of the clarity of the main provision of the Clean Air Act, judges 
would be reluctant to find permission to consider costs elsewhere, 
since Congress "does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory 
scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions - it does not, one might 
say, hide elephants in mouseholes."194 This is a standard approach to 
statutory interpretation. It does not suggest that, when a statute's 
"fundamental details" are vague, they will be interpreted to forbid 
consideration of cost. 
But it is possible to read the Court's opinion a bit more broadly. 
Recall that in concluding that the EPA need not consider costs in 
issuing national standards, the Court emphasized that some provisions 
of the Clean Air Act explicitly refer to costs, and explicitly require 
them to be taken into account. Here the Court was using the canon of 
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius: the expression of one 
thing is the exclusion of another. In the particular context of 
environmental statutes, the expressio unius canon could have explosive 
implications. When Congress does not explicitly refer to costs, 
agencies may not consider them, and for one simple reason: Congress 
191. 42 u.s.c. 7409(b)(l) (1994). 
192. Whitman, 121 S. Ct. at 910. 
193. Id. at 921. 
194. Id. at 910. 
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often does explicitly refer to costs. If the canon is to govern the future, 
the cost-benefit default principles are in some trouble. 
There is a further point. The Court seems to suggest that a statute 
should not be taken to confer broad discretionary authority on 
agencies: "We find it implausible that Congress would give to the EPA 
through these modest words the power to determine whether 
implementation costs should moderate national air quality 
standards."195 To support the view that American Trucking is best 
taken to prohibit agencies from interpreting ambiguous statutes to 
allow consideration of costs, it would be necessary to make a simple, 
two-step argument. First, statutes should be construed so as to give 
agencies less rather than more discretion. This idea would amount to a 
qualification of Chevron, one that would reduce agency power to 
interpret statutes.196 Second, a ·  construction of a statute that would 
allow agencies to decide whether to consider costs significantly 
increases agency discretion. The claim here is not that a statute 
requiring cost-benefit analysis is itself disfavored on delegation 
grounds. The claim is instead that whatever Chevron says, an 
interpretation should be disfavored if its consequence would be to 
authorize the agency to decide whether to engage in cost-benefit 
balancing. If this claim is accepted, then the default rule in favor of 
allowing agencies to consider costs stands as repudiated. 
This concern may animate part of Justice Breyer's concurring 
opinion. Justice Breyer urges: 
In order better to achieve regulatory goals - for example, to allocate 
resources so that they save more lives or produce a cleaner environment 
- regulators must often take account of all of a proposed regulation's 
adverse effects, at least where those effects clearly threaten serious and 
disproportionate public harm. Hence, I believe that, other things being 
equal, we should " read silences or ambiguities in the language of 
regulatory statutes as permitting, not forbidding, this type of rational 
regulation.197 
Justice Breyer expressly endorses the default rule of Michigan v. EPA, 
saying that in the face of statutory ambiguity, agencies should be 
allowed to consider costs, if only because that approach would 
increase the likelihood of rational regulation. 
But it is most unlikely that the Court would disagree with Justice 
Breyer. The expressio unius canon can be a useful guide to statutory 
construction, and the more natural, cost-blind reading of "public 
health" is certainly supported by the fact that some provisions of the 
Clean Air Act make explicit reference to costs. But here as elsewhere, 
the expressio unius idea should be taken with many grains of salt. If 
Congress has not, under some ambiguous statutory term, referred to 
costs, it will often be because Congress, as an institution, has not 
resolved the question whether costs should be considered. And if this 
195. Id. 
196. See also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
197. Whitman, 121 S. Ct. at 921. 
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is so, the agency is entitled to consider costs if it chooses.198 The fact 
that Congress explicitly refers to costs under other provisions is not a 
good indication that, under an ambiguous text, costs are statutorily 
irrelevant. This would be an extravagant and therefore implausible 
inference. The use of the expressio unius approach in American 
Trucking is best taken as a sensible way of fortifying the most natural 
interpretation, and not at all as a way of urging that explicit references 
to cost, in some provisions, means that costs may not be considered 
under ambiguous provisions. 
What about concerns about agency discretion? Agencies are 
typically allowed to interpret statutory ambiguities,199 and in countless 
cases in which that principle is invoked, the agency exercises a great 
deal of discretion over basic issues of policy and principle.200 To allow 
an agency to decide to consider costs is not to allow it to exercise more 
discretion than it does in numerous cases. But where the statute is 
unclear, agencies should be authorized to seek "rational regulation"; 
and nothing in American Trucking suggests otherwise. This is 
especially so in light of the fact, emphasized by both the Court201 and 
Justice Breyer,202 that the Clean Air Act allows EPA to consider costs 
at numerous stages in the implementation process. I conclude that 
American Trucking is best taken not to question the cost-benefit 
default principles, and indeed that the most reasonable reading of the 
opinion is that the Court has explicitly embraced that principle. 
IV. UNDERLYING CONSIDERATIONS 
What are the foundations of the cost-benefit default principles? 
What is their rationale? Though the various default principles should 
be evaluated separately, there are common concerns in the 
background. We begin with statutory interpretation in general. 
A. Ambiguity, Absurdity, and Excessive Generality 
1 .  Three Kinds of Default Principles 
There is nothing new or unusual about default principles for 
statutory interpretation. They are ubiquitous. In fact, they are 
inevitable.203 Language has no meaning without default principles of 
198. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
199. See id. 
200. See, e.g., id.; Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687 (1995); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition 
Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986). 
201. Whitman, 121 S. Ct. at 908-909. 
202. Id. at 921. 
203. For discussion from different perspectives, see WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the 
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 420-135 (1989). 
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many kinds; everyone uses them every day. Generally such principles 
are agreed-upon, so much so that they do not seem to be principles at 
all. They are part of what it means to understand the relevant 
language. They need not even be identified, much less defended. We 
take them for granted. But sometimes the principles are contested, or 
at least contestable, and in such cases, they must certainly be identified 
and defended, and the fact that they are being used is obvious to all. 
We might distinguish three circumstances here: 
1. The simplest cases involves genuine ambiguity, in the sense that 
without resort to an identifiable default principle, courts really do not 
know what the statutory term means. Here the default principle will 
operate as a tiebreaker, authorizing an agency to act when the case is 
otherwise in equipoise. The use of default principles is uncontroversial 
in such cases; without some such principles, cases cannot be decided. 
2. Less simple cases involve texts that are most naturally or easily 
taken to forbid the agency action, but when there is nonetheless 
ambiguity. Here the default principles serve as "clear statement" 
principles, suggesting that the statute will be understood to allow the 
agency to do what it seeks unless Congress expressly says otherwise. 
This is of course a more aggressive use of default principles, pushing 
statutes away from the disfavored terrain. It appears to be the law, for 
example, that agencies will be allowed to consider costs unless 
Congress expressly prohibits them from doing so.204 This is a clear 
statement principle, used not only when courts are in equipoise. 
3. The third and most complex cases involve the sort of interpretive 
problem that might be understood to involve excessive generality or 
absurdity. This is the kind of problem found when, for example, a 
statute saying "no vehicles in the park" is applied to a war memorial 
consisting of a tank used in World War Il,205 or when a nephew who 
has murdered his uncle seeks to inherit under a will that has not been 
revoked.206 In many legal systems, courts will look behind the language 
of the statute to prevent an outcome that makes no sense and that 
could not possibly have been intended.207 This was the court's 
suggestion about the de minimis exception in Alabama Power,208 and 
the court's requirement that EPA consider health-health tradeoffs was 
clearly understood in similar terms, as an effort to prevent an outcome 
that would be "bizarre" and hence one that Congress could not have 
wanted.209 In the environmental context, the Supreme Court itself has 
said . that where a statute's literal meaning would produce absurdity, 
the term "has no plain meaning . . . and is the proper subject of 
construction by the EPA and the courts."210 This idea has been 
204. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
205. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961 ). 
206. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (1889). 
207. See INTERPRETING STATUTES (D. Neil MacCormick et al. eds., 1991). 
208. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
209. Am. Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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expressly invoked in favor of allowing the EPA to consider the 
substitute risks produced by aggressive regulation of lead in water.211 
2. Sense v. Nonsense 
These are the circumstances for using default principles.212 But 
what is the appropriate content of such principles? This is a large 
question, and it makes sense to begin with established understandings. 
Where meaning is not clear, many time-honored principles are 
designed to give sense and rationality the benefit of the doubt. An old 
interpretive principle, with roots in almost all legal systems,213 counsels 
courts to avoid "absurdity"; s9metimes this principle has been taken to 
override statutory language. More particular principles of considerable 
current importance disfavor retroactivity;214 require Congress to speak 
clearly if it seeks to create exemptions from the antitrust law; give the 
benefit of the doubt to Native Americans; and say that agencies will 
not, on their own, be taken to have the authority to apply statutes 
outside the territorial boundaries of the United States.215 It was 
probably inevitable that courts, confronted with a wide range of 
regulatory enactments, would eventually develop a set of analogues 
for the regulatory state - principles that give rationality and sense the 
benefit of the doubt in the particular context of contemporary 
regulatory law.216 
The cost-benefit default principles are best defended on just this 
ground - that they do give sense and rationality the benefit of the 
doubt, and that Congress should not be taken to have mandated 
irrationality or absurdity.217 On this count, some of the default 
210. Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116, 126 (1985). 
211. See Am. Water Works Ass'n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Am. 
Trucking Ass'n, 175 F.3d at 1052 . 
212. I do not explore here the choice between "intention-mimicking" and "intention­
eliciting" default rules, a choice well elaborated in the law of contract. See Ian Ayres & 
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). In the area of statutory construction, it might be thought that 
courts should do what they think Congress would have done, if it had made provision on the 
point (a suggestion that supports the cost-benefit default rules) - and that if courts are 
unsure what Congress would have done, they should choose a rule that will encourage 
Congress to be more clear in the future (a suggestion that might argue against some of the 
default rules, on the ground that without them, Congress will be led to be clearer in the 
future). For detailed discussion, see Einer Elhauge (2000) (unpublished manuscripts, on file 
with author). 
213. See INTERPRETING STATUTES, supra note 207. 
214. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1988). 
215. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000). 
216. Compare the controversial suggestion in · RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998), that the common law embodies principles of economic 
efficiency. I am suggesting a more modest point - not that courts are pursuing efficiency, 
economically defined, but that they are converging on a less sectarian, more modest set of 
ideas, allowing agencies to move in directions that can be seen as sensible from a wide 
variety of standpoints. 
216. See Am. Water Works Ass'n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
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principles should be less controversial than others. At the very least, it 
seems sensible to say that agencies ought to be permitted to ignore 
trivial risks and to balance the health benefits of regulation against the 
health costs of regulation. Where Congress has left things unclear, 
agencies should have discretion to move statutes away from (what 
they reasonably consider to be) the domain of senselessness. Notice 
that defended in this modest way, the cost-benefit default principles 
combine substantive ideas about regulatory policy with institutional 
ones in the form of a posture of judicial deference, allowing agencies 
room to maneuver.218 Because agencies are specialized in the topic at 
hand, and because they have a degree of political accountability, they 
are permitted to do what the cost-benefit default principles authorize. 
If agencies choose to do otherwise, there is, on the rationale as stated, 
nothing wrong with that. 
But we should acknowledge here that it is possible to discern two 
different strands in the cases establishing the cost-benefit default 
principles. Call the first strand antiregulatory and the second 
technocratic. On the antiregulatory strand, the principles are best seen 
as an effort to block regulation,219 perhaps on the theory that 
regulation is frequently illegitimate from the standpoint of liberty, 
perhaps on the ground that it usually does more harm than good. The 
antiregulatory strand links the principles with those prevailing in the 
discredited Lochner era,220 where courts used both constitutional and 
interpretive principles to limit regulation. 
By contrast, the technocratic strand embodies no animus against 
regulation as such. It is neutral on that question, assessing regulation 
only on the basis of what the data show. Indeed, it sees cost-benefit 
analysis as a frequent impetus to regulation, as in the phaseouts of lead 
and CFCs.221 For technocrats, the impetus toward cost-benefit analysis 
is as much a check on insufficient regulation as it is a limitation on 
excessive controls. 
To the extent that the cost-benefit principles are approved here, it 
is because and to the extent that they embody the technocratic strand, 
enlisting policy analysis in the service of better regulation. The 
antiregulatory motivation for the default principles is illegitimate, a 
218. For a powerful attack on unduly complex canons of construction and a plea for 
simplicity, see Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (2000). I do not 
deal here with the objection that the cost-benefit default principles make statutory 
interpretation too unruly. As they operate in the cases, the principles seem reasonably 
straightforward and do not produce undue complexity. But it is easy to imagine a situation in 
which these default principles coexisted with a number of others, thus making decisions 
unnecessarily complex. 
219. Of course there is no avoiding "regulation." What is ordinarily described as 
"opposition to regulation" is in reality no such thing, but approval of that form of regulation 
that is embodied in principles of contract, tort, and property law. Nonregulation is not a 
possibility, short of anarchy. I use the terminology of "regulation" and "antiregulation" to 
conform to common usage. The real opposition is to specific kinds and forms of regulation. 
220. After Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
221. See RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICT, OZONE DIPLOMACY 63 (1991); COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS AT EPA 77-83, 131-64 (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997). 
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form of judicial hubri!i. But . it should not be denied that both strands 
play a role in the cases. Let us now investigate some details. 
B.  De Minimis Exceptions and Acceptable Risks 
The idea that agencies may make de minimis exceptions is an 
outgrowth of the old idea, de minimis non curat lex. If the risk at issue 
is tiny, the agency is not required to eliminate it. Much of the rationale 
here is a kind of implicit cost-benefit balancing. If regulation occurs, 
both private and public resources will have to be expended in order to 
ensure compliance. When the benefits of regulation are trivial, the 
agency is permitted to ·refuse to regulate, on the ground that the costs 
are likely to outweigh any benefits.222 When the benefits of regulation 
are trivial, no one is likely to have anything to complain about if 
regulation is foregone. Those . who complain are likely to be well­
organized private groups with a self-interested agenda, unrelated to 
the purposes for which the statute was enacted.223 
This understanding has the virtue of helping to account for the 
courts' otherwise puzzling refusal to allow EPA to make a de minimis 
exception under the color additive provisions of the Delaney Clause.224 
Perhaps these decisions are best attributed to the fact that the 
statutory terms seem unambiguous. But as one court emphasized, it is 
unclear if significant costs are actually created by a decision to ban 
color additives.225 While the benefits of a ban are low, the costs are, in 
the particular circumstances, low as well. If the costs of regulation are 
trivial, perhaps a trivial gain from regulation is justified too. The 
general point is that, because trivial risks are unlikely to be worth 
private and public resources, they need not be controlled unless 
Congress has explicitly said that agencies must control them. The 
Chemical Manufacturers case226. embodies this idea with the suggestion 
that costly regulations cannot be imposed unless there is a showing of 
environmental benefits.227 
C. Health-Health Tradeoffs 
In a way, the idea of "health-health tradeoffs" is the simplest of all. 
If agencies impose health risks at the same time that they protect 
health, they should, at the very least, be permitted to take this fact into 
account. What matters most, after all, is whether risks are being 
reduced on balance (though distributional and equitable concerns can 
222. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
223. As plausible examples, see Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 
1979); Alabama Power, 636 F.2d 323; Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 217 F.3d 
861 (D.C. Cir. 2000), discussed supra Part 11.D.3. 
224. Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
225. Id. at 1111.  
226. See supra text accompanying notes 121-126. 
227. Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n, 217 F.3d at 865-67. 
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complicate this claim, as discussed below). Other things being equal, it 
is hardly desirable for government to reduce the respiratory risks of 
ground-level ozone if ground-level ozone also provides significant 
protection against cancer and cataracts.228 The agency should be 
permitted to ask whether this is what it should do, subject to review 
for reasonableness. 
Now this does not mean that a sensible legislature will inevitably 
ask agencies to compare health risks with health benefits. Perhaps an 
institutional division of labor is desirable, so that some agencies deal 
with some risks, whereas other agencies attend to others.229 It is 
imaginable, for example, that an agency entrusted with promoting fuel 
economy is not supposed to consider safety issues, which are the 
province of another institution. If the two agencies are not working at 
cross purposes, and are engaged in some effort at coordination, it is 
possible that this division of labor makes sense. My only claim is that 
when an agency is aggravating one health problem while it is resolving 
another, it ought to be permitted to take that factor into account 
unless Congress has said otherwise. In any case, permission to engage 
in health-health balancing helps counteract the constant risk of tunnel 
vision on the part of regulators. 
At this stage one might ask why, to many people, health-health 
analysis seems so much less controversial than cost-benefit analysis. 
Many people seem skeptical of the idea that costs should be balanced 
against lives saved,230 but few people are skeptical of the idea that lives 
saved should be balanced against lives lost. The simplest explanation is 
that people have a great deal of difficulty in trading off life against 
dollars, not only cognitively but also morally, and the very idea of 
ascribing an explicit monetary value to a (statistical) life remains 
controversial.231 When people are asked to weigh health against health, 
the mental operation is far less troublesome. People generally agree 
that agencies should attempt to save more lives on balance, rather 
than fewer. Note that this is a descriptive point about how people tend 
to think, intended to help explain what might seem to be an anomaly; 
it is not a normative point at all. 
228. Am. Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
229. See Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI . L. REV. 1533 (1996). 
230. See, e.g. , ELIZABETH ANDERSON, v ALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993). 
231 .  For intriguing psychological evidence, see Philip Tetlock, Taboo Tradeoffs (2000) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). It might well be that the refusal to balance 
costs and benefits is an overgeneralization of a sound moral posture in ordinary life. In 
deciding whether to break a promise, or to betray a friend, we do not ordinarily balance 
costs against benefits, at least not in any simple or direct sense. There is a general 
understanding that some tradeoffs are indeed "taboo," in the sense that certain reasons for 
action are blocked, not merely outweighed. I speculate that the opposition to cost-benefit 
analysis, in government policy, is an overgeneralization of moral commitments that work 
well in the private domain. See JONATHAN BARON, JUDGMENT MISGUIDED (1998). 
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Why should agencies be presumptively entitled to consider costs? 
The basic idea is that a "benefits only" approach also reflects a kind of 
tunnel vision, a myopic focus on only one of the variety of things that 
matter. Suppose, for example, that one approach to regulation would 
produce a certain level of air quality benefits, but at a cost of $800 
million, and that a competing approach would produce a trivially 
lower level of air quality benefits, but at a cost of $150 million. If costs 
can be made relevant, the agency is permitted to do what seems quite 
sensible: save the $650 million, because the benefits would not be high 
enough to justify the expenditure. 
Of course it would be necessary to know a great deal more to know 
how to evaluate the particular problem. If the $650 million would 
mean a significant loss of jobs, and if the lower air quality benefits 
would not result in significant mortality or morbidity effects, it seems 
most sensible not to expend the resources. But if the $650 million 
would mean slightly reduced profits for producers or slightly increased 
prices for a dispensable good, and if the air quality benefits would 
mean a real reduction in respiratory problems for tens of thousands of 
asthmatics, the case for more stringent regulation is far stronger. The 
point is not that a bare accounting of costs and benefits tells officials 
all of what they need to know.232 It is only that a sensible agency is 
entitled to, and does, "consider" the costs of regulation. Congress 
should not be understood to have banned agencies from doing this. If 
Congress has a particular reason to require otherwise, it is permitted 
to do exactly that. 
Ideas of this sort help support the closely related idea that agencies 
are presumptively permitted to compare costs against benefits, and 
also to consider whether compliance is feasible.233 As we will see in 
more detail, the feasibility constraint is both ambiguous and, from the 
normative perspective, somewhat crude, because there is no 
identifiable point at which regulation becomes not feasible. But a 
feasibility constraint, crude though it is, can be defended in the same 
basic way as the presumption against mandatory control of 
insignificant risks. If compliance is not feasible, there is a good chance 
that regulation is not worthwhile. The least that can be said is that if 
regulation is so costly that it would force many companies to go out of 
business, with inevitable adverse effects for workers, the agency ought 
to have a very strong reason for imposing it. 
V. AGENCY PERMISSION VS. AGENCY REQUIREMENTS 
Thus far we have seen what agencies are permitted to do if 
Congress is silent on the point. But it is necessary to distinguish 
232. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 
YALE L.J. 165 (1999) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is only a decision procedure). 
233. See supra Parts II F, II G. 
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between cases in which an agency attempts to do what cost-benefit 
principles permit and cases in which an agency refuses to do what 
courts are permitting. We know that, for the agency, no legal problem 
will arise in the first set of cases. What about the second? Might the 
default principles sometimes require agencies to follow a particular 
course? Of course, any judicial requirements to this effect would be 
more aggressive, and controversial, than the judicial permissions that I 
have been discussing thus far. 
A. Revisiting the Framework 
We have seen that the default principles operate to expand agency 
discretion. Alongside Chevron, they permit agencies to understand 
regulatory statutes in ways that seem to give sense and rationality the 
benefit of the doubt. 
If agencies are to be required, and not merely permitted, to follow 
the default principles, it will be for one of two reasons. First, the 
statute might require them to do so under Chevron Step One. Second, 
an agency's decision not to follow the default rule might be 
unreasonable under Chevron Step Two. Let us now turn to more 
details. 
B. The Framework Applied 
Suppose that the agency has refused to allow a de minimis 
exemption, or to engage in health-health comparisons, or to consider 
costs when the statute allows it to do so. If the agency has refused to 
do what the cost-benefit principles permit it to do, the Chevron 
analysis would proceed in the following way. 
1 .  Under Chevron Step One, has the agency violated unambiguous 
congressional instructions, or transgressed some judgment made 
"directly" by Congress? The answer, by hypothesis, will be no. The 
statute is ambiguous rather than clear. 
The only possible response is that the cost-benefit default rule now 
operates as a kind of canon of construction, serving as part of the 
inquiry in Chevron Step One. This argument is adventurous, but not as 
much as it might appear. Many canons of construction operate at 
Chevron Step One and are indeed determinative of the Step One 
analysis.234 Consider, for example, the following canons: statutes will 
not be understood to apply outside the territorial borders of the 
United States;235 statutes will not be understood to apply 
retroactively;236 statutes will not be taken to raise serious constitutional 
questions.237 Agency interpretations that conflict with these canons of 
234. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY 
POLICY (4th ed. 1999). 
235. EEOC v Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
236. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1988). 
237. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council, 485 
U.S. 568 (1988). . 
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construction do not prevail under Chevron Step One, not because 
Congress has clearly expressed its will, but because Congress is 
required to speak with clarity if it wishes agencies to act in the way 
that they seek. Perhaps the cost-benefit default principle should be 
understood in similar terms. 
While possible, this application of the cost-benefit default 
principles would require a significant departure from existing law. The 
canons of construction discussed above have a degree of longevity, 
indeed a straightforward justification from longstanding traditions.238 
The cost-benefit default principles have not yet acquired the status of 
the canons of construction that operate as part of Chevron Step One. 
It is therefore exceedingly doubtful that an agency's refusal to proceed 
in the manner suggested by the cost-benefit default principles would 
be struck down under Step One.239 At least it is doubtful at this 
relatively early stage; perhaps these default principles will coalesce 
before long into agreed-upon background rules, and at that stage they 
will indeed play a role under Step One. 
2. Under Chevron Step Two, is the agency's interpretation of the 
statute "reasonable"? It could certainly be controversial for courts to 
insist that it is not. Here courts are narrowing agency discretion, not 
expanding it. And if agencies are, by virtue of their technical expertise 
and political accountability, in a good position to decide whether to 
follow one of the default rules, then courts should not impose 
mandates of their own. Nonetheless, the same reasons that justify the 
default rules in general might well be taken to suggest that agencies 
should be required generally to comply with the default rules. This 
compliance could be regulated through the judicial use of a rebuttable 
presumption. The agency's interpretation is to be presumed 
unreasonable under Chevron Step Two if it means that the agency will 
not be making health-health tradeoffs, exempting trivial risks, 
considering costs or feasibility, or engaging in cost-benefit balancing.240 
Of these various possibilities, the presumption of unreasonableness is 
strongest when the agency is attempting to regulate a de minimis risk241 
or refusing to consider health-health tradeoffs.242 Why should 
expenditures be required for trivial risks? Why should the agency be 
permitted to increase overall risks? In such cases, the agency's decision 
238. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION (1997) (defending canons 
if and only if they are vindicated by tradition). 
239. Evidence to this effect comes from International Union, VA W v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 
665 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding agency decision not to make cost-benefit analysis the basis 
for decision under a statute that, in the court's view, would have allowed the agency to 
perform cost-benefit analysis). 
240. Not that there was no challenge to the agency's decision under Chevron Step Two 
in International Union, VA W v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665, though the court's reasoning suggests 
that the challenge would have failed . 
. 241. This is the apparent holding of Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 217 
F.3d 861, 866-67 (D.C. Cir. 2000), which held that the agency is not permitted, under Step 
Two, to impose a regulation that has no environmental benefits. 
242. This appears to be the court's holding about the benefits of ground-level ozone in 
American Trucking Association v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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seems most obviously unreasonable. For this reason, courts might well 
require agencies to offer extremely good explanations for their 
seemingly arbitrary course of action. 
The argument that agencies would be unreasonable to reject the 
other default principles is less clear. But even in such cases, any 
reasonable judgment will ordinarily be based on some kind of 
weighing of costs and benefits, not on an inquiry into benefits alone.243 
Return to Michigan v. EPA and suppose that in some states, the costs 
of reducing the "significant contribution" would be exceedingly high, 
whereas the benefits would be low in light of the fact that the risks 
associated with the relevant concentrations of ozone are not severe. If 
the costs would be high and the benefits low, on what rationale should 
be the EPA refuse even to consider the former? There appears to be 
no good answer. If there is not, the agency's interpretations should be 
declared unreasonable. 
Notice that what is involved here is a presumption only, and it is 
rebuttable. Courts should give agencies the benefit of the doubt here. 
It is possible to imagine agency explanations that would show why its 
view - to reject one or another of the cost-benefit default principles 
- is reasonable. It is that question to which I now turn. 
C. Rebutting the Presumption 
In several contexts, Congress, as well as agencies and courts, could 
reasonably find the default principles inapplicable. The following 
catalogue is intended to identify circumstances in which agencies 
might sensibly decide not to go in the direction suggested by the 
default principles - and also in which a reasonable legislature might 
ban agencies from going in that direction. 
1. Regulating de minimis risks: the case of low benefits and 
administrative difficulties. Suppose that an agency has discretion to 
interpret the relevant statute so as to allow exemptions of de minimis 
risks for carcinogenic color additives in food. Suppose that the agency 
refuses to interpret the statute this way because (a) the benefits of 
color food additives are generally low (noncarcinogenic color additives 
will do about as well); (b) as a matter of science, it is not always simple 
to distinguish between weak and strong carcinogens; and ( c) a flat rule 
will be simpler to administer. This sort of explanation appears fully 
reasonable. It would distinguish the case from one in which the agency 
attempts to interpret the OSHA statute in such a way as to call for 
costly regulation of insignificant risks. 
2. Regulating risks that might or might not be de minimis: the case 
of scientific ignorance. Suppose that the agency attempts to regulate 
risks that (it agrees) cannot be shown to be significant. Suppose that it 
contends not that it will understand the statute to cover demonstrably 
243. But see id. (upholding a significant risk/feasibility reading of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, notwithstanding a previous decision suggesting that cost-benefit 
balancing would have been a permissible reading) . 
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insignificant or demonstrably de minimis risks, but instead to cover 
instead risks that, in light of existing scientific information, might be 
small but might be large - a distinction that cannot be made with 
existing tools and in light of existing scientific .understandings. In other 
words, the agency interprets the statute to allow regulation where the 
benefits might be significant, but cannot be shown to be significant 
given existing knowledge. This, in short, is a case where there is a wide 
range of expected benefits, from quite low to quite high, and where 
science cannot choose a probable "point" along the range (not an 
uncommon situation; see tables 1 and 2 for examples). 
This does not seem to be an unreasonable interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute. Certainly the agency should be required to identify 
the range of potential benefits, so as to ensure that the possible gains, 
discounted by the probability that they will be realized, is sufficient to 
make regulation worthwhile. It is not hard to imagine cases of this 
kind; table 2 provides examples here as well. The basic point is that 
when scientific understanding is primitive, it can be perfectly 
reasonable to regulate risks that might be small but might be large. 
Indeed, such regulation might even survive cost-benefit balancing, 
notwithstanding the real possibility that when more is known, the risk 
will turn out to be de minimis. 
3. Disregarding costs at one stage of a multistage inquiry. Might it 
be reasonable for an agency to interpret a statute not to allow 
consideration of costs? In some cases, this would indeed be 
reasonable. Recall that under the Clean Air Act, the EPA is supposed 
to set standards at the level that, with an "adequate margin of safety," 
are "requisite to protect the public health. "244 At first glance it might 
appear quite unreasonable for the agency not to consider costs if it has 
the discretion to do so. Whether it is worthwhile to produce a certain 
level of benefits would seem to depend, at least in part, on the cost of 
achieving those benefits. But suppose that the EPA urges (as it has for 
a number of years, and as the Supreme Court has approved245) that 
costs will be considered not in setting standards in the first instance 
(where health is the sole consideration), but at other, later stages, in 
the development of state implementation plans and in insistence on 
deadlines for compliance. In such a system, the EPA would say that 
national ambient air quality standards are based only on an inquiry 
into issues of health, that this is a benefits-based judgment, but that 
the decision how and when to meet those standards, made through 
complex procedures at the state and federal levels, will consider costs 
as well as benefits. 
In fact this is how the Clean Air Act now operates.246 National 
standards are issued in what is at least nominally a cost-blind manner, 
but costs emphatically and openly play a part at other stages of the 
244. 42 u.s.c. § 7409(b) (1994). 
245. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001). 
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994); Portney, supra note 25. 
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process, in the design and enforcement of state implementation plans. 
Whether or not it is ultimately convincing, this kind of procedural 
defense of "health only" judgments seems at least plausible. From this 
defense, it follows that even if the relevant provisions of the Clean Air 
Act are taken to be ambiguous,247 it would be reasonable, under 
Chevron Step Two, to understand national standard setting to be cost­
blind, not because cost-blindness is itself reasonable (it isn't), but 
because costs are taken into account at later stages of a multistage 
inquiry.248 Whether it would be better for costs to be considered 
throughout is an issue on which reasonable people can differ. This is a 
highly pragmatic question, on which general enthusiasm for cost­
benefit balancing is not decisive. 
4. Disregarding particular costs as statutorily irrelevant. There are 
other arenas in which at least some kinds of costs might reasonably be 
disregarded. Suppose, for example, that the FAA concluded that the 
needs of the air tour industry were entitled to no weight in issuing 
regulations controlling noise at the Grand Canyon. Under a different 
administration, the FAA might believe that the statute is best 
understood to ensure that those who enjoy the Grand Canyon can do 
so with a minimum of noise - and that the adverse effects on the air 
tour industry are irrelevant, even if this means that fewer people will 
be able to enjoy the Grand Canyon. At first glance, this is an entirely 
reasonable judgment. Where Congress has been unclear, 
administrations and administrators might make different decisions on 
that question. 
5. Disregarding feasibility as part of overall balancing. Is it ever 
reasonable for an agency to ignore the question whether regulation is 
either economically or technologically feasible for the industry? Might 
the FAA choose to interpret an ambiguous statute so as to impose an 
air quality regulation that would not be economically feasible for the 
air tour industry over the Grand Canyon, so that the relevant 
companies could not stay in business? At first glance, economic 
feasibility seems relevant. But it is possible to imagine cases in which 
an agency might reasonably choose to interpret a statute to allow rules 
that are not economically feasible. The agency might believe that it is 
more important to reduce noise levels than to allow the continued 
operation of the air tour industry. When judgments of this kind are 
made, the agency effectively engages in a kind of cost-benefit 
balancing, one that justifies regulation that is not economically 
feasible. Of course an agency might engage in technology-forcing, 
247. I do not believe that they are, for reasons given in Lead Industries Association v. 
EPA, 647 F.2d 1 130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and followed in American Trucking Association, 175 
F.3d 1027. 
248. From this it follows that the Supreme Court properly rejected the plea for cost­
consciousness in American Trucking Association, 175 F.3d 1027, not by rejecting cost-benefit 
default rules, but by invoking the clarity of the statutory text and the fact that taken as a 
whole, the system for implementing national ambient air quality standards is far from cost­
blind. Of course this is not a claim that as a matter of policy, the current system is optimal. 
For discussion, see MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: 
ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS (2d ed. 1996). 
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though usually this approach depends on a prior judgment that 
regulation is indeed both economically and technologically feasible to 
develop. 
6. Rights and irreversibility. Thus far the discussion has 
emphasized pragmatic or instrumental considerations. But are there 
contexts in which the cost-benefit default principles are inapplicable in 
principle? In many domains, of course, cost-benefit balancing fails to 
describe the operation of law; rights-based thinking often "blocks" 
resorts to costs, or at least costs of a certain kind.249 Ordinarily ideas of 
this sort play a role in constitutional law,250 where certain "costs" are 
off limits. For example, the costs undoubtedly associated with 
politically controversial speech are not a legitimate basis for regulating 
such speech. Those costs are entitled to no weight at all; it is not as if 
they count, but are insufficiently high. 
Such thinking is not foreign to regulatory policy. The most vivid 
example is the Endangered Species Act,251 which forbids an agency 
from engaging in action that would threaten members of endangered 
species even if a balancing test would appear to justify the action.252 In 
holding that the statute disallows balancing, the Court relied on what 
it said was the unambiguous meaning of the text.253 But as Justice 
Powell showed iri dissent, the language :was not so clear as to disallow 
invocation of a strong default principle, one that would justify a degree 
of balancing.254 Can the outcome in the case be explained in a legal 
system pervaded by cost-benefit default principles? 
Perhaps it cannot. Perhaps the Court's decision is an anachronism, 
inconsistent with the current judicial enthusiasm for balancing. But 
there is another explanation. The Endangered Species Act is 
concerned with preventing genuinely irreversible losses, and at least in 
the context of human activities that cause. extinction, perhaps the 
statute is best taken to be rooted in a theory of rights, one that rebuts 
the presumption in favor of cost-benefit balancing. Now, it is possible 
that some kind of "meta-balancing" justifies a flat prohibition on 
actions that would destroy members of an endangered species. 
Perhaps that higher form of cost-benefit balancing calls for a refusal to 
engage in cost-benefit balancing in particular cases. The benefits might 
be thought to be so high, and the costs usually so low, as to support 
such a prohibition, disallowing balancing each time. But this way of 
understanding the statute seems to misconceive its foundations, which 
lie in a judgment that human beings should not knowingly bring about 
249. See the discussion of exclusionary reasons in JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF 
FREEDOM (1986). 
250. See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1999). 
251 .  16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-44 (1994). 
252. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
253. Id. at 162. 
254. Id. at 166 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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the extinction of other species,255 at least in the absence of truly 
extraordinary circumstances. 256 
It is possible to generalize from this example. Where regulatory 
policy is designed to ensure against irreversible damage, or otherwise 
to protect constitutional rights, the cost-benefit default principles 
might well be displaced. In most domains of regulatory policy, 
however, what is involved is not the danger of irreversible loss, but 
instead issues of degree, and hence the presumption remains intact. 
VI. UNSETILED QUEST IONS: SPECIFYING THE PR INC IPLES 
The cost-benefit default principles leave many open questions. 
They are abstract and general. Courts have done extremely little to 
particularize them. Agencies have done somewhat more, but they have 
made only a start.257 OMB has set out "best practices" for agency 
use;258 because of the importance and generally high quality of OMB's 
guidance, excerpts are included as an Appendix. It is here that a great 
deal of law will be made in the next decades. I offer a few remarks on 
the crucial issues. 
A. The Incipient Common Law of Acceptable Risks 
What makes a risk "significant" or "de minimis"? Here the law is 
extremely ill-developed. Perhaps we can find some agreed-upon 
standards for labeling a risk de minimis. If the risk is less than that 
created by eating a moderate number of peanuts with legally 
permitted aflotoxin levels, or from living in Denver rather than New 
York for a week every year, the case seems relatively easy. Risks of 
this little are the kind that people ignore each day. But how should we 
evaluate, say, a cancer risk of one in one million from lifetime 
exposure to a certain carcinogenic substance? One in 100,000? One in 
ten million? Does it matter if the exposed population is large or small? 
These are the pivotal questions. For guidance, it might be noted 
that the International Commission on Radiological Protection 
recommends that environmental factors should not be allowed to 
cause an incremental cancer risk, for those exposed over a lifetime, of 
three in 1 ,000 or more.259 But the practice of American agencies is 
255. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 14, at 1085-1089. 
256. In the wake of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, Congress amended 
section 7 of the Act to establish a special committee, known as the "God Squad," to make 
exemptions, and thus to permit action to go forward under extraordinary circumstances. In 
the decades since the amendment, no wholesale exemption has ever been granted. 
257. See Office of Management and Budget, Report to Congress on the Costs and 
Benefits of Federal Regulations (2000), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/ 
2000fedreg-report.pdf; see also Adler & Posner, supra note 15 (discussing agency practice). 
258. Office of Management and Budget, Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations 
Under Executive Order 12,866 (Jan. 11 ,  1996), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
inforeg/riaguide.html. 
259. March Sadowitz & John D. Graham, A Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permitted 
by Health, Safety and Environmental Policy, 6 RISKS 17 (1995). 
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highly variable, with the EPA's acceptable range varying, under 
different programs, from one in 10,000 to one in 1 ,000,000.260 In the 
Benzene Case, the plurality of the Supreme Court attempted to 
provide some clarification, making a distinction between two 
quantitatively different levels of risk. If the risk of getting cancer from 
drinking a glass of water is one in a billion, the plurality said, it could 
not possibly be considered significant.261 By contrast, a fatality risk of 
1/1 ,000 from regular inhalation of gasoline vapors "might well" be 
considered significant.262 OSHA has built on this simple idea in issuing 
its own regulations. Thus the agency has said that a lifetime risk of 
1 .64/1 ,000 will be counted as significant, whereas a lifetime risk of 0.6 
in 100,000 "may be approaching a level that can be viewed as safe."263 
The effort to look at the statistical risk faced by members of the 
exposed population is certainly a start, and in light of the Supreme 
Court's statements, perhaps OSHA's approach is sufficient to survive 
judicial scrutiny, while the EPA's one-million standard might be 
questionable.264 Certainly an effort at quantification is a helpful way of 
clarifying the basis for the agency's decision, especially laudable in 
light of the slipperiness of the idea of 'significance." But many 
questions might be asked. In deciding whether a risk is trivial or 
significant, it would seem important to ask not only about the level of 
the risk faced by each person, but also about the size of the exposed 
population.265 If two people in the United States face a lifetime risk of 
2/10,000, perhaps the risk should not be deemed significant in light of 
the fact that it is overwhelmingly likely that no fatalities will be 
suffered. We could easily imagine a challenge to a decision to treat 
such a risk as "significant" as a matter of law.266 Certainly the agency 
should explain any failure to take account of the small number of 
exposed people - even though it would probably be reasonable, as a 
matter of law, for the agency to concern itself with probabilities faced 
by individuals, at least if it is not permitted to engage in cost-benefit 
balancing. 
At the same time, a statistically small risk, if faced by large 
numbers of people, might well be deemed significant. If twenty million 
people face a lifetime risk of 11200,000, one-hundred people are 
expected to die - far from a trivial number. If 200 million people face 
a risk of 1/1 million, 200 people are also expected to die. Is this 
260. Id. 
261. See Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 665 
(1980). 
262. See id. 
263. 52 Fed Reg 46,168, 46,234 (Dec. 4, 1987) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910 & 
1926). 
264. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 440 (3d ed. 
2000). 
265. Agency attention to the size of the exposed population is strongly urged in JAMES 
T. HAMILTON & W. KIP VISCUS!, CALCULATING RISKS (1999). 
266. Id. 
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number insignificant merely because the statistical risk for each person 
is small? We could easily imagine a challenge to an agency decision to 
treat the latter risk as '�insignificant"; indeed, that challenge might 
even be convincing. The point raises serious doubts about the 
Supreme Court plurality's confidence that a risk of one in a billion, 
from drinking a glass of water, could not be deemed significant. If each 
person drinks five glasses of water per day, and if there are 260 million 
Americans, the one-in-a-billion risk no longer seems so small, 
converted into expected annual fatalities (474.5, hardly an insignificant 
number). We should therefore conclude that it is at least reasonable 
for agencies to consider risks to be ·"significant,"· and not de minimis, if 
the probability is very low but the exposed population quite large. It is 
also reasonable to suggest that if the probability is very low but the 
exposed population sufficiently large, a high number of expected 
fatalities should require the agency to consider the risk "significant" as 
a matter of law. 
There is an additional problem. Both OSHA and the Supreme 
Court seem to focus on the "lifetime" risk - that is, the risk that 
would come from being exposed to a substance for all of one's 
working life. Under OSHA, it does seem that this focus is required by 
the statute, at least for toxic substances, for which the relevant 
provision is expressly drawn in terms of lifetime exposure.267 But in the 
abstract, and under other provisions, we should not be focussing on 
the risk, of fatality or anything else, that would come from a lifetime of 
exposure, except to the extent that all, most, or many people actually 
have a lifetime of exposure. Imagine, for example, that almost all 
workers in the relevant industry are exposed, not for their lifetimes, 
but for five years or less. What risk do they face? This is the crucial 
question. Perhaps the risk, for them, is a small fraction of the lifetime 
risk. Sensible policy requires the government to reduce the risks that 
people actually face, not the risk that people fancifully face. When an 
agency has discretion, the agency should look not at lifetime risk, but 
at actual risk. 
What all this suggests is that when agencies are asking whether 
risks are significant, they ought to move in the direction of setting out 
a range of "expected benefits," in terms of mortality, morbidity, and 
other relevant variables.268 These variables could be aggregated into 
some sort of total number, below which a risk would be treated as 
insignificant. Of course there will be a large degree of guesswork in 
generating the relevant numbers. Of course too there will be a degree 
of arbitrariness in choosing the precise point at which risks are no 
longer significant. But without movement in the direction of 
quantification, it will not be possible to produce informed, transparent, 
267. See 29 U.S.C. § 655 (b) (5) 
268. This is the direction suggested in American Trucking Association v. EPA, 175 F.3d 
1027, 1039-1040 (D.C. Cir. 1999). On some of the complexities, see Sunstein, Arsenic, supra 
note 62. 
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and consistent policy.269 Thus, an effort to quantify the level of risk 
that would be deemed acceptable would replace the current system, 
with its high degree of inconsistency and guesswork, with something 
like a common law of acceptable risks.270 
B. The Meaning of Feasibility: No "On-Off' Switch 
What does it mean to say that regulation must be "feasible"? In the 
abstract, a requirement that regulation be "feasible" might seem to 
invite cost-benefit balancing. In the private sector, a "feasibility study" 
is essentially an exercise in cost-benefit balancing. But as we have 
seen, a feasibility requirement involves no balancing of costs and 
benefits.271 It requires instead a cost-only inquiry into whether 
achievement of the regulatory goal is "practicable."272 
Assume, for example, that a regulation would cost $800 million, 
and that in the process it would save ten lives per year; assume also 
that the exposed population is relatively small, so that each of the 
exposed workers faces a lifetime risk of well over one in 1 ,000. It is 
easy to imagine that this regulation would be entirely feasible, in the 
sense that the industry would face no technical problems in meeting it, 
and also in the sense that it would be practicable for industry to bear 
the cost. But it is also easy to imagine that such a regulation would fail 
cost-benefit analysis, in the sense that $800 million expense would not 
be justified by the (relatively lower) monetized savings. If a statistical 
life is valued at $5 million, for example, the benefits ($50 million) 
would be only one-eighth the cost. 
But it would be wrong to think that cost-benefit analysis is more 
"antiregulatory" than a feasibility constraint. We can easily imagine a 
regulation that might not be feasible, but that might satisfy a 
requirement of cost-benefit balancing. Suppose, for example, that a 
regulation would cost $2 billion, that industry could not bear that cost 
without many business failures, but that the regulation would save 
5,000 lives. In some cases, the cost-benefit requirement is more 
protective, not less protective, of intended beneficiaries of regulatory 
programs. 
So far, perhaps, things are clear enough. But there is a problem 
here as well. Most importantly, feasibility is not an on-off switch. Any 
significant increase in costs is likely to prove "not feasible" for at least 
some companies. As the costs increase, the number of companies for 
whom the regulation proves "not feasible" will increase, too. In these 
circumstances, it seems extremely artificial to say that at a certain 
point, regulation becomes "not feasible." Perhaps there is a set point 
at which regulation, by virtue of its stringency, establishes a sudden, 
large-scale increase in the number of companies who cannot bear the 
269. See HAMILTON & VISCUS!, supra note 265. 
270. See Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 259. 
271. Arn. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
272. Id. 
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cost of regulatory controls while continuing in business. But it is more 
likely that as the costs grow, the number of companies who cannot 
bear the cost grows too, perhaps with several specific points at which 
that number spikes upwards. In these circumstances, what sense is 
made by a "feasibility" constraint? At first glance, very little. Just as 
safety is not an absolute, but a matter of degree, so too for feasibility. 
Law that says otherwise appears to substitute a comforting but 
misleading formula for a serious confrontation with the issues at stake. 
Perhaps there is an intelligible answer here. Perhaps Congress 
wants to say that for most regulations, companies must comply unless 
a large number of them can show that they cannot comply and 
continue. Certainly this is a relatively simple inquiry in most cases. 
What makes little sense is the suggestion that agencies can pick a 
single point that is "feasible" and go to, but not beyond, that point. 
In these circumstances, how can we account for the evident 
popularity of requirements that regulation be "feasible" or 
"achievable"? There are several possibilities, suggesting that the 
feasibility standard might be justified by reference to institutional 
considerations. From the standpoint of those concerned with safety 
and the environment, a cost-benefit standard might be thought to 
introduce undue opportunities for industry to stall the process, 
perhaps because of the prospect and actuality of judicial review.273 A 
requirement that regulation must be "feasible" greatly improves the 
agency's chances in court. In fact this conclusion is well supported by 
the record of agencies on appeal; no agency has ever lost a challenge to 
the feasibility of its regulation, while cost-benefit requirements have 
proved troublesome for agencies in court.274 
This is a point about .the goals of supporters of environmental 
regulation. From the standpoint of Congress, there is a separate point. 
A statute that expressly refers to cost-benefit balancing seems to invite 
complaints about the decision to trade lives for dollars. For this 
reason, statutes that embody cost-benefit analysis ("CBA") are 
unpopular in many circles. (It is noteworthy here that none of the 
actual and seriously considered enactments involving cost-benefit 
balancing has ever set out numbers for valuing regulatory benefits.) 
Legislators who seek to avoid complaints about CBA, while also 
seeking to impose a constraint on excessive regulation, might naturally 
be drawn to feasibility requirements. From the standpoint of industry, 
perhaps "feasibility" statutes are not so troublesome if it is possible to 
maintain control over the agency's docket and over appropriations, so 
as to ensure that draconian statutes are, in practice, far less than that. 
These points help explain the appeal of feasibility constraints. But 
they still do not tell us what such constraints mean. The best, though 
not entirely satisfactory, answer is that a regulation becomes infeasible 
273. For evidence, see Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(invalidating asbestos ban). 
274. See, e.g., id.; Aqua Slide N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831 
(5th Cir. 1978). 
. 
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if it would result in significant dislocations in the industry, in the form 
of large numbers of business failures, substantial losses of jobs, or the 
equivalent.275 Ideas of this sort are qualitative, rather than quantitative, 
and in implementation they leave a great deal of discretion to 
agencies. What might be expected in the future is a more quantitative 
account from agencies implementing regulations that are said to be 
feasible, or refusing to impose regulations said to be infeasible. 
C. Considering Costs 
What of principles (or statutes) that ask agencies to "take into 
consideration" costs (and other relevant factors)? Statutes of this kind 
typically include an "achievability" constraint as well, one that 
operates, in practice, in the same way as a feasibility requirement. 
What is added by the idea that agencies should also take costs into 
consideration? 
The answer seems to be that such provisions· give agencies the 
discretion not to go to the full extent of feasibility if the costs of doing 
so are disproportionately high. Suppose, for example, that a regulation 
would cost $800 million and that it would save ten lives annually. 
Suppose too that it is entirely feasible. If the agency is permitted to 
take costs into consideration, presumably it is permitted to impose a 
less intrusive regulation, or perhaps not to regulate at all. The 
foregoing sentence is qualified because the idea that costs must be 
taken "into consideration" does not say how much weight costs must 
have; it does not say, by itself, to what extent agencies must treat costs 
as relevant to the ultimate decision. Presumably it would be unlawful 
for an agency to ignore costs altogether. If the agency were permitted 
to do this, the "consideration" requirement would be empty. At a 
minimum, then, the agency must discuss cost and explain its decision 
in light of cost. Similarly, an agency that is allowed to "consider" costs, 
but need not take account of feasibility, is authorized to soften 
regulation by selecting less expensive and also less effective means.276 
Hard questions would arise if an agency authorized to "consider" costs 
chooses means that are much less expensive but also much less 
effective. 
This is a procedural understanding of the "consideration" 
requirement, one that has precedent under other statutes.277 But is 
there a substantive requirement as well? Must an agency give some 
kind of weight to costs, in addition to discussing them? The best 
answer is "yes" to both questions. An agency decision would be 
unlawful if it gave no weight whatsoever to costs, as, for example, 
275. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Bldg. and Constr. Trades Dept. v. OSHA, 838 F.2d 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Nat'l Cottonseed 
Prods. Ass'n v. Brock, 825 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
276. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
277. Most notably the National Environmental Policy Act. See Stryker's Bay 
Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980). 
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through the choice of a regulation that would do only trivially more 
good than one that would be 50% less costly. An agency decision 
would also be doubtful if it made costs an overriding factor as, for 
example, by choosing a regulation that is slightly less expensive (say, 
$1 million annually) but also much less effective (say, because it would 
leave thirty additional deaths annually). 
On this view, a requirement that an agency take costs into 
consideration falls short of cost-benefit analysis, in the sense that the 
agency is expected to give principal weight to the initially identified 
factor, and from there to make adjustments because of costs.278 An 
agency would run into difficulty if it transformed costs into the 
overriding statutory factor or if it gave costs no substantive 
consideration at all. These are the polar cases for administrative 
illegality. Cases that fall between the poles may present hard line­
drawing questions, but no serious conceptual issues. 
D. Of Costs and Benefits 
It remains to discuss the largest problem of all. If cost-benefit 
balancing is required, what is an agency permitted to do? What is it 
prohibited from doing? Of course hard issues of valuation arise here. 
If an agency values a life at $10 million, it will produce outcomes very 
different from those that would follow if it valued a life at $500,000. Is 
an agency permitted to value a life at, say, $100 million, or at 
$50,000?279 
1 .  Basic Issues of Valuation: The Standard Approach 
For several decades, agencies have undertaken cost-benefit 
analysis of major regulations, even when cost-benefit analysis is not 
the basis for decision but is merely a matter of informing the public 
about the consequences of proposed courses of action.280 But how are 
costs and benefits to be calculated? In principle, the issue is often 
easier to resolve on the cost side, though the practical problems here 
can be very serious, especially in light of industry's incentive to 
overestimate costs. With respect to benefits, the now-standard 
approach involves an effort to calculate people's "willingness to pay" 
for the various goods at stake.281 Sophisticated (though still 
controversial282) methods are available for this purpose.283 
278. See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119-1120 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding 
that the factors that follow the "taking into consideration" language must be treated as 
secondary). 
279. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
280. For an overview, see Richard Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory 
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
281 . This approach is challenged in many places. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, 
VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993). 
282. See MARKETS, MORTALITY, AND WORK (1998). 
283. See W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS (1992). 
June 2001 Cost-Benefit Default Principles 1705 
There remains a good deal of variation across agencies, with 
statistical lives being valued at between $1.5 million and $6.1 million.284 
With respect to statistical lives, consider the following table285: 
TABLE 3:  VALUATIONS OF LIFE 
AGENCY REGULATION CITATION VALUE 
($ mil.) 
Department of Proposed Establishment 55 FR 32064 1.5 
Transportation - Federal of the Harlingen Airport August 6, 1990 
Aviation Administration Radar Service Area, TX 
Department of Agriculture Pathogen Reduction: 61 FR 38806 1.6 
- Food Safety and Hazard Analysis and July 25, 1996 
Inspection Service Critical Control Point 
Systems 
Department of Health and Regulations Restricting 61 FR 44396 2.5 
Human Services - Food the Sale and Distribution August 28, 1996 
and Drug Administration of Cigarettes and 
Smokeless Tobacco to 
Protect Children and 
Adolescents 
Department of Aircraft Flight Simulator 61 FR 34508 2.7 
Transportation - Federal Use in Pilot Training, July 2, 1996 
Aviation Administration Testing, and Checking 
and at Training Centers 
Environmental Protection Protection of 53 FR 30566 3.0 
Agency Stratospheric Ozone August 12, 1988 
Department of Health and Proposed Rules to Amend 56 FR 60856 3.0 
Human Services - Food the Food Labeling November 27, 
and Drug Administration Regulations 1991 
Department of Financial Responsibility 61 FR 38992 3.0 
Transportation - Federal Requirements for July 25, 1996 
Aviation Administration Licensed Launch 
Activities 
Department of Agriculture Proposed National School 59 FR 30218 1.5, 3.0 
- Food and Nutrition Lunch Program and June 10, 1994 
Service School Breakfast Program 
Environmental Protection National Ambient Air 62 FR 38652 4.8 
Agency Quality Standards for July 18, 1997 
Particulate Matter 
Environmental Protection National Ambient Air 62 FR 38856 4.8 
Agency Quality Standards for July 18, 1996 
Ozone 
284. See Adler & Posner, supra note 15. EPA is generally using a number of $4.8 million 
per statistical life saved. See SECTION 812 RETROSPECTIVE (1997). 
285. I borrowed this from Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, supra note 15. 
1706 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1651 
Department of Health and Medical Devices: Current 61 FR 52602 5.0 
Human Services - Food Good Manufacturing October 7, 1996 
and Drug Administration Practice 
Department of Health and Quality Mammography 62 FR 55852 5.0 
Human Services - Public Standards October 28, 
Health Service, Food and 1997 
Drug Administration 
Environmental Protection Requirements for Lead- 61 FR 45778 5.5 
Agency Based Paint Activities in August 29, 1996 
Target Housing and 
Child-Occupied Facilities 
Environmental Protection National Primary 63 FR 69390 5.6 
Agency Drinking Water December 16, 
Regulations: Disinfectants 1998 
and Disinfection 
Byproducts 
Environmental Protection Radon in Drinking Water 64 FR 9560 5.8 
Agency Health Risk Reduction February 26, 
and Cost Analysis 1999 
Environmental Protection Arsenic in Drinking 66 FR 7014 6.1 
Agency Water (Jan. 22, 2001) 
Environmental Protection Radon in Drinking Water 64 FR 9560 5.8 
Agency Health Risk Reduction (Feb. 26, 1999) 
and Cost Analysis 
Notwithstanding these variations, willingness to pay is the general 
basis for undertaking calculations. In theory, willingness to pay is 
usually calculated by determining how much people do pay in actual 
market settings, to reduce statistically small risks of harm. It is on the 
basis of this sort of analysis that the EPA compiled the following 
table,286 which can be taken as representative: 
TABLE 4: WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY ("WTP") ESTIMATES 
(MEAN VALUES) 
Health Endpoint Mean WTP Value Per Incident 
($ amount in 1990) 
Mortality 
Life saved $4.8 million 
Life year extended $120,000 
Hospital Admissions: 
All Respiratory Illnesses, all ages $12,700 
Pneumonia, age < 65 $13,400 
COPD, age > 65 $15,900 
286. INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES GROUP, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, OZONE AND PARTICULATES (1998). 
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Ischemic Heart Disease, age < 65 $ 20,600 
Congestive Heart Failure, age > 65 $ 16,600 
Emergency Visits for Asthma $9,000 
Chronic Bronchitis $260,000 
Upper Respiratory Symptoms $19 
Lower Respiratory Symptoms $12 
Acute Bronchitis $45 
Acute Respiratory Symptoms (any of 19) $18 
Asthma $32 
Shortness of Breath $5.30 
Sinusitis and Hay Fever Not monetized 
Work Loss Days $83 
Restricted Activity Days (RAD) 
Minor RAD $38 
Respiratory RAD not monetized 
Worker Productivity $1 per worker per 10% change in 
ozone 
Visibility: Residential $14 per unit decrease in deciview 
Recreational per household 
Range of $7.30 to $11 per unit 
decrease in deciview per 
household (see U.S. EPA, 1997a) 
Household Soiling Damage $2.50 per household per •g/m' 
To become intelligible, of course, these numbers must be combined 
with an assessment of the problems that would be averted with various 
approaches to regulation. As an example of such an assessment, 
consider the EPA's effort to specify the anticipated health benefits 
from its particulates standard. 
TABLE 5: PROPOSED PM10 STANDARD (50/150 •G/M3 ) 99TH 
PERCENTILE NATIONAL ANNUAL HEALTH INCIDENCE REDUCTIONS 
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS: (year = 2010) 
Partial Attainment 
ENDPOINT Scenario 
Annual PM,. (•wm') 50 
Daily PM .. (•wm') 150 
1. Mortality: Short-Term Exposure 360 
Lon�-Term Exposure 340 
2. Chronic Bronchitis 6,800 
Hospital Admissions: 
3. All Respiratory (all ages) 190 
All Respiratory (ages 65+) 470 
Pneumonia (ages 65+) 170 
COPD (ages 65+) 140 
4. Congestive Heart Failure 130 
5. Ischemic Heart Disease 140 
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6. Acute Bronchitis 1,100 
7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms 10,400 
8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms 5,300 
Shortness of Breath 18,300 
Asthma Attacks 8,800 
9. Work Loss Days 106,000 
10. Minor Restricted Activity Days (MRADs) 879,000 
A simple exercise of multiplication, putting the two tables together, 
will generate monetized benefits, which can then be compared with 
monetized costs. Of course it is possible to challenge the numbers in 
both tables. Perhaps willingness to pay has not been properly 
calculated. Perhaps willingness to pay is not the proper basis for 
monetizing regulatory benefits, and some other method should be 
used instead. Those who accept the need for balancing need not also 
accept the willingness to pay criterion. Perhaps the agency has 
understated or overstated the number of lives saved or chronic 
bronchitis cases; perhaps the agency has overvalued or undervalued 
the dollar value of life or other health benefits. In fact, evidence 
suggests that prospective estimates are bound to contain serious 
errors. The Office of Technology Assessment, asked in 1992 to 
evaluate the accuracy of OSHA's prospective estimates, found many 
mistakes.287 One reason is that the government must begin with the 
industry's own estimates, which will often be self-serving and even 
alarmist. But the basic method increasingly dominates administrative 
practice. 
287. See OMB, 1999 REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 40-43. A table, id. at 41, contains an 
illuminating summary: 
ESTIMATED COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OSHA RULES: 
PROSPECTIVE VS. RETROSPECTIVE 
Regulation Year Issued Estimated Costs Estimated Benefits 
Vinyl Chloride (a) 1974 Overestimated by a factor Not clear 
of four 
Cotton Dust (a) 1978 Overestimated by a factor .Overestimated by more 
of three than a factor of two 
Lead (Secondary Smelters) 1978 Capital costs significantly Overestimated the 
underestimated importance of 
engineering controls in 
achieving benefits 
Ethylene Oxide (Hospitals) (•) 1984 About right Not clear 
Formaldehyde (Metal 1987 Over by a factor of two Not clear 
Foundries) (although costs of 
engineering controls 
considerably 
underestimated) 
Grain Handling 1987 Not clear Not clear 
PSDI Power Presses (b) 1988 Underestimated costs, overestimated benefits, or both 
Powered Platforms (b) 1989 Underestimated costs, overestimated ben�fits, or both 
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When would a given cost-benefit ratio be held to be unlawful? The 
simplest answer is when the costs significantly exceed the benefits, 
properly measured. A reasonable agency might begin with numbers 
near the middle of both market valuations288 and government 
valuations289 - in the case of a statistical life, somewhere between $4 
million and $8 million.290 If an agency seeks to deviate from those 
numbers, it should explain why. The basic idea is that there should be 
a presumption in favor of adherence to the normal range, with an 
explanation of departures from the numbers thus indicated. And if the 
agency seeks to go forward with a regulation whose costs significantly 
exceed benefits, it should have to explain why it is doing that. 
A legitimate risk in allowing departures is that the stated rationale 
will conceal an effort to placate powerful private groups not having a 
strong claim to governmental assistance.291 Both the EPA and its 
Science Advisory Board have explored the possibility of adjusting the 
ordinary numbers because of equitable factors, including the 
involuntariness and uncontrollability of the risk.292 Actually, there are 
many possible grounds for making adjustments. For example, an 
agency might make a reasonable upward adjustment if it believes that 
children are largely at risk - perhaps because more life-years are at 
stake, perhaps because children are unable to protect themselves and 
hence have a special equitable claim to government resources.293 A 
downward adjustment would similarly be lawful if the agency finds 
that mostly old people are at risk, so that any extensions of lives would 
produce a low level of savings in terms of life-years. Or the agency 
might reasonably conclude that special attention should be given to 
risks faced by poor people or African Americans, on the ground that 
existing injustice is compounded in a situation in which health and 
environmental dangers are thus concentrated. Here values of various 
sorts can properly enter into the decision; the standard economic 
variables need not be decisive. 
In its arsenic rule, the EPA offered an analysis of how the benefits 
would be reassessed if the involuntariness and uncontrollability of 
arsenic were considered, suggesting that this would produce a 7 %  
increase in benefits.294 In an important essay, Richard Revesz has 
288. See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843 (2000). 
289. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY 
POLICY 30-31 (4th ed. 1999); Adler & Posner, supra note 15. 
290. But see Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative 
Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323 (2001) (urging inflation of these numbers). 
291. See Viscusi, supra note 288 (documenting abuses of this kind). 
292. See 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, at 7013-7017 (Jan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
9, 141 & 142). . 
293. See the acknowledgement of the relevance of life-years in American Dental 
Association v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 1993). 
· 
294. See 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, at 7016 (Jan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141 
& 142). 
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urged that the government's failure to make upwards adjustments for 
uncontrollable, involuntary, and dread risks results in a substantial 
understatement of the monetized benefits of regulation.295 We could 
easily imagine a creative legal challenge to rules as insufficiently 
stringent and insufficiently explained if adjustments are not made, at 
least if the agency fails to explain itself. 
Agencies should also be permitted to take into account the fact 
that people care about relative economic position, not only absolute 
economic position, and thus to adjust market valuations upwards.296 
And the agency could reasonably employ "incidence analysis," 
involving consideration of who wins and who loses, to conclude that 
regulation should go forward notwithstanding the fact that costs 
exceed benefits (see the reference to distributional considerations in 
OMB's "best practices" document, in the appendix). If, for example, 
the benefits are $800 million, but enjoyed mostly by low-income 
workers, whereas the costs are $900 million, but faced mostly by 
consumers generally, it seems reasonable for the agency to go forward, 
at least if Congress has not expressly precluded that judgment. 
There is a larger point here. In addition to knowing the benefits 
and costs of regulation, it is necessary to know who bears those costs 
and enjoys those benefits, and also the particular nature of those costs 
and benefits. Suppose, for example, that an occupational safety and 
health regulation would have a total cost of $600 million, and that the 
monetized benefits would be $400 million (including, say, forty lives 
saved per year, and hence $200 million in monetized savings from 
fatalities averted). Is it clear that this regulation should not go 
forward? For various reasons it is not. If the people who are saved are 
children or teenagers, the uniform lives saved number might 
undervalue the relevant benefits. Equally important: What does the 
$600 million mean, concretely? Does it mean that prices will increase 
by a little for many people? That cost might be worth incurring. So too 
if the consequence of the $600 million expenditure would be a 
reduction in annual profits for companies that already make billions. 
Or does the cost mean that poor people will lose their jobs? An ideal 
cost-benefit analysis would tell us something about the incidence of 
both costs and benefits. It makes sense to say that the "bottom line" 
numbers will not be decisive when an incidence analysis shows that 
those numbers should be adjusted to take account of the identify of 
the winners and losers. Of course it is possible to think that we lack the 
tools to engage in a good incidence analysis, or that an assessment of 
distributional issues will be subject to interest-group manipulation, and 
hence that the "bottom line" numbers should be used for pragmatic 
reasons.297 
295. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the 
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999). 
296. See Frank & Sunstein, supra note 290. 
297. See Viscusi, Risk Equity, supra note 288. 
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While these points give agencies a degree of flexibility, they do not 
give them carte blanche, because they operate in limited domains, and 
because they come with a duty of reasoned explanation. This duty is 
procedural, but it is far more than that. In the Corrosion Proof Fittings 
case, for example, it is hard to see how the agency could have justified 
the extreme cost-benefit ratios that applied to certain bans on 
asbestos.298 
3. The Discount Rate 
Perhaps the most difficult issue here, from the theoretical point of 
view, involves the selection of the appropriate discount rate. How 
should the agency value future gains and losses? In terms of ultimate 
outcomes, the choice matters a great deal. If an agency chooses a 
discount rate of 2%, the outcome will be very different from what it 
would be if an agency were to choose a discount rate of 10%; the 
benefits calculation will shift dramatically as a result. If a human life is 
valued at $8 million, and if an agency chooses a 10% discount rate, a 
life saved 100 years from now is worth only $581 .299 "At a discount rate 
of 5%,  one death next year counts for more than a billion deaths in 
500 years."300 OMB suggests a 7% discount rate (see Appendix); but 
this is highly controversial. A key question is therefore: What legal 
constraints should be imposed on the agency's choice?301 
. My basic conclusion is that it is much harder to untangle the 
theoretical issue than to identify. the appropriate posture of reviewing 
courts. In this highly technical area, courts should generally adopt a 
posture of deference, requiring agencies only to produce a reasonable 
explanation for their choice and to show a degree of consistency. One 
reason for deference is the extreme complexity of the underlying 
issues. Another reason is the risk that an aggressive judicial posture 
would contribute to the "ossification" of rulemaking302 - a particular 
problem in this setting, because any particular discount rate will be 
easy to challenge with reasonable arguments that it is too low or too 
high.303 To understand these points, some details are in order. 
Usually statutes are silent on the question of appropriate discount 
rate. In fact, I have been unable to find any statute that specifies a 
discount rate for agencies to follow. On judicial review, the question 
will therefore involve a claim that the agency's choice is arbitrary. 
298. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
299. See Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation, 92 
NW. U. L. REV. 706, 742-43 (1998). 
300. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 357 (1984). 
301. Valuable treatments include Revesz, supra note 295; Comment, Judicial Review of 
Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333 (1998). 
302. Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992). 
303. I am therefore disagreeing with the endorsement of "hard look" review in the 
excellent Comment, supra note 15. 
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Here the national government shows strikingly (and inexplicably) 
variable practices. As noted, the Office of Management and Budget 
suggests a 7% discount rate,304 departing from a 10% rate in the 
1980s.305 But agencies are not bound by OMB guidelines, and they 
have ranged from as low as 0% (EPA, latency period for cancer from 
arsenic) and 3% (Food and Drug Administration, Department of 
Housing and Urban development ) to as high as 10% (EPA).306 In fact 
the same agency sometimes endorses different discount rates for no 
apparent reason - with EPA, for example, selecting a 3% rate for 
regulation of lead-based paint as compared to 7% for regulation of 
drinking water, and 10% rates, respectively, for regulation of 
emissions from locomotives.307 Here government practice seems 
extremely erratic. 
From the purely economic standpoint, there are serious 
conundrums here.308 The impetus for discounting future effects stems 
from the judgment that, in the context of money, discounting future 
benefits and losses is entirely rational, even simple: a dollar today is 
worth more than a dollar tomorrow. There are two reasons: 
investment value (or opportunity cost) and pure time preference.309 A 
dollar today can be invested, and for this reason it is worth more than 
a dollar a year from now. An emphasis on the investment value of 
money yields a discount rate of roughly 5 %  - 7%.  Quite apart from 
this point, people generally seem to have a preference for receiving 
money sooner rather than later. People value current consumption 
more than they value future consumption. An inquiry into pure time 
preference produces lower discount rates of 1 % - 3%.  Though they 
lead to different numbers, both points justify discounting future 
income gains and losses. 
So far, so good. The problem is that, notwithstanding conventional 
wisdom among economists, these points are not easily taken to justify 
a discount rate for the nonmonetary benefits of regulation (see table 5 
for an overview of such benefits). If a regulation will save ten lives this 
year and ten lives annually for the next ten· years, it cannot plausibly 
be urged that the future savings are worth less than the current savings 
on the ground that a current life saved can be immediately '.'invested." 
The point about investment value, or the opportunity cost of using 
capital, seems utterly irrelevant here. With time preference, things are 
less clear. Perhaps people would rather save ten lives today than ten 
lives in a decade. But it is unclear that this is so. And even if it is, what 
moral status would such a time preference have? Almost certainly it 
makes sense to say that it would be worse for you to lose your limb 
304. See OMB, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed Reg at 53,520 (1992). 
305. See Appendix for details; see also Revesz, supra note 295, at 950. 
306. See Comment, supra note 15, at 1336-37. 
307. Id. at 1337. 
308. See id. at 1341-1350; see also Appendix for excerpts from OMB's own account. 
309. Id. at 1341-46. 
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now than to lose it ih·.ten years; in the latter case, you will have ten 
years' use of the limb. And probably it makes sense to say that 
agencies should attend to life-years saved, not only lives saved. But 
holding all this constant, the death of a thirty-five-year-old in 2004 
does not seem worth more than the death of a thirty-five-year-old in 
2044. And since different people are involved, the moral problem is 
serious: the preference of the chooser in 2002 is certainly relevant to 
determining that chooser's own fate, and the timing of risks that might 
come to fruition ·for that chooser. But the chooser's preference cannot 
easily be used to determine the fate of someone not yet born. 
These points suggest that, as Richard Revesz argues, it is important 
to distinguish two issues that go under the name of "discounting" and 
that have yet to be separated in administrative practice: (a) latent 
harms, in the form of exposures whose consequences will occur late in 
someone's lifetime; and (b) harms to future generations.310 It is 
reasonable to say that latent harms should count for less than 
immediate ones, since they remove fewer years from people's lives and 
because people do seem to prefer, other things being equal, a harm in 
the future to a present harm. For latent harms, some kind of discount 
rate is sensible. Consider, for example, the case of arsenic. In its 
regulation, the EPA treated an arsenic death in the future as 
equivalent to an arsenic death in the present; even though an arsenic 
death is likely to come, if it does come, ·many years after exposure.311 
On this count, the EP A's judgment seems wrong, even arbitrary; some 
kind of discount rate is clearly appropriate here.312 It would be easy to 
imagine a challenge to the failure to discount the latent harms here. 
On the other hand, OMB's 7% figure, based on the investment value 
of money is probably too high.313 There is no reason to believe that the 
discount rate for ·future health harms is equal to the discount rate for 
future income effects, and considerable reason to believe otherwise.314 
Indeed, the use of a 7% discount rate, if it decisively affects the 
ultimate decision, would seem to be legally doubtful - arbitrary in its 
own way . .  
But the case of harms to future generations, or people not yet 
born, is altogether different, and in that case the usual grounds for 
discounting monetary benefits are quite inapplicable. For this reason 
some people think that no discounting · is appropriate for the 
nonmonetary benefits of regulation.315 On this view, a life-year saved is 
310. As argued convincingly in Revesz, supra ·note 295. 
311 .  See 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, at 7013 (Jan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141 
& 142). 
312. See Revesz, supra 295; Jason Burnett & Robert W. Hahn, EPA 's Arsenic Rule: The 
Benefits of the Standard Do Not Justify the Costs (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author). 
313. See Revesz, supra note 295, at 981-87. 
314. See id. 
315. Id. at 987-1009 (offering a qualified version of this view). 
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a life-year saved, and it does not matter, for purposes of valuation, 
when the saving occurs. 
But there seems to be a major objection to this way of proceeding: 
it would appear to require truly extraordinary sacrifices from the 
present for the sake of the (infinite) future. Perhaps the "failure to 
discount would leave all generations at a subsistence level of existence, 
because benefits would be postponed perpetually for the future. "316 On 
the other hand, it is not clear that the assumption behind this objection 
is convincing. Technological and other advances made by the current 
generation benefit future generations as well, and hence 
impoverishment of the current generation would inevitably harm 
those who will come later.317 In any case there is a hard ethical 
question here - how much the current generation should suffer for 
the benefit of the future - and a judgment against discounting would 
not answer that question unless we were sure that as a matter of 
policy, we should be engaging in maximizing some aggregate welfare 
function.318 It is not at all clear that this form of maximization is the 
appropriate choice to make. 
At this point it should be clear that these issues are exceedingly 
complex and that agencies asked to engage in cost-benefit analysis 
have no clear path to an appropriate choice of discount rate for future 
generations. My principal topic, however, is not regulatory policy, but 
the implementation of the cost-benefit default principles. In the face of 
the underlying conundrums, the most that a reviewing court can 
require is a rationale for the agency's choice that is both articulated 
and reasonable. There are several possibilities here,319 suggesting what 
courts should and should not do: 
• Courts should not require costs and benefits to have the same 
discount rate, at least not if costs are to be absorbed in terms of 
dollars, and benefits will come in terms of fatalities and illnesses 
averted. It follows that in Corrosion Proof Fittings, the court of 
appeals was quite wrong to tell EPA to produce an "apples-to­
apples comparison, even if this entails discounting benefits of a 
non-monetary nature."320 
• Courts should not simply defer to agency decisions as a "policy 
choice," as did one court in an unusually complex setting.321 What 
is necessary is some kind of explanation for the choice. 
316. See DAVID w. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 223-24 (1990). 
317. Revesz, supra note 295, at 994. 
318. Tyler Cowen & Derek Perfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in JUSTICE 
BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 144, 149 (Peter Laslett & James s. Fishkin 
eds., 1992). 
319. For a good discussion, see DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM (1999). 
320. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1218 (5th Cir. 1991). 
321. Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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• For latent harms, it is hard to justify a refusal to apply any 
discount rate at all. A discount rate of 2% - 3% seems to make 
the best sense. If the agency refuses to discount, it should be 
prepared to explain itself. At the same time, an agency's use of a 
7 %  discount rate for latent harms would be hard to defend, 
because that figure comes from the investment value of money. 
• In the case of future generations, courts should acknowledge that 
good explanations can be given for a wide range of choices -
between, say, a discount rate of 0% (for future generations, not 
latent harms) and 7% (OMB's suggestion for future generations). 
So long as the agency gives a sensible rationale and departs from 
it only on the basis of articulated reasons, courts should respect 
the choice. The value judgments here can be reasonably disputed, 
and they should be made democratically, not judicially. It follows 
that in the context of discount rates, as elsewhere, the common 
law of cost-benefit analysis is to be developed at the 
administrative level, subject only to · judicial review for 
reasonableness. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this Article I have attempted to identify the cost-benefit default 
principles, to defend their use, and to explore their meaning for the 
future. In the face of statutory ambiguity, courts now permit agencies 
to refuse to regulate when a significant risk is not shown or beyond the 
point where regulation is not feasible, to consider costs, and to engage 
in a form of cost-benefit balancing. At their least intrusive, the cost­
benefit default rules allow the agency to go in the suggested direction 
when the statute is unclear. At their most intrusive, the principles 
require the agency to act in the way they suggest unless Congress has 
unambiguously said otherwise. 
I have argued on behalf of the least intrusive version of the cost­
benefit default rules, by suggesting that they are likely to give sense 
and rationality the benefit of the doubt. At the same time, I have 
urged that the argument on their behalf is presumptive only, and that 
in certain contexts, agencies have good reasons for embarking on a 
different course. The question is whether agencies have been able to 
offer a reasonable defense of their decisions. I have also suggested, 
though more tentatively, that mandatory use of the principles is often 
a good idea. 
One of my major goals has been to set out some guidelines for the 
future, both under the cost-benefit default principles and under 
statutes that point in the same direction. Agencies should particularize 
the idea of "significant" and "de minimis" risks through quantitative 
guidelines. Of course, the statistical probability of harm is not all that 
matters; the size of the exposed population is important as well. 
"Feasibility" is not an off-on switch, and here, too, agencies should 
specify what they understand the term to mean, beginning with the 
admittedly vague notion that massive dislocations would be both 
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necessary and sufficient to show that regulation is not feasible. We 
have seen that, with respect to valuation of life and health, market 
measures can provide a good start, from which agencies are entitled to 
make reasonable adjustments. We have also seen that the most 
difficult issue involves selection of the appropriate discount rate. 
Reviewing courts should not require agencies to apply the same 
discount rate to life and health that they apply to money; with respect 
to discounting, there are good reasons to distinguish money from other 
goods. The most that courts can do is to impose ceilings and floors on 
agency judgments, by requiring a good rationale for whatever discount 
rate is chosen. 
The most general conclusion, signaled by the rise of the cost­
benefit default principles, is that the nation is nearing the end of a 
"first generation" debate about whether to adopt a presumption in 
favor of cost-benefit balancing, and rapidly moving into a "second 
generation" debate about when the presumption is rebutted, and 
about what cost-benefit analysis specifically entails. If cost-benefit 
analysis is to be defended, it is not because of especially controversial 
judgments of value, but because of a belief that regulatory action 
should be judged largely in terms of its effects.322 Suitably specified and 
understood, the cost-benefit default principles should be regarded not 
as a technique for stalling desirable regulation, but as a pragmatic 
effort to ensure that regulation responds to serious problems rather 
than to trivial or imaginary ones. And if they are seen in these terms, 
the cost-benefit default principles operate not only as a foundation for 
deterring regulation that promises to do less good than harm, but also 
as a basis for producing regulatory action when an assessment of the 
consequences shows that regulation is desirable.323 
322. Of course there is no way of assessing consequences, or even identifying them, that 
is entirely neutral on evaluative questions. What I mean to suggest is that agreed-upon 
understandings can do the necessary work here. See the outline of the track record of cost­
benefit analysis at EPA, supra notes 48-54. 
323. See the account, supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text, of instances in which 
cost-benefit balancing spurred regulatory action. 
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APPENDIX: 
EXCERPTS FROM OMB GUIDANCE ON COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
The following consists of excerpts from OMB's "best practices" 
guidelines for cost-benefit analysis. Because the understanding of cost­
benefit analysis is so much better developed within OMB than within 
courts and the legal culture, it is worth attending, with some care, to 
OMB's suggestions. I have challenged some of OMB's claims -
especially on the appropriate discount rate - but there is no question 
that OMB has offered a helpful and thoughtful treatment of many of 
the underlying problems. 
January 11 ,  1996 
Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations 
Under Executive Order 12866 
III. ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS AND COSTS 
A. General Principles 
3. Discounting. One of the problems that arises in developing a 
benefit-cost analysis is that the benefits and costs often occur in 
different time periods. When this occurs, it is not appropriate, when 
comparing benefits and costs, to simply add up the benefits and costs 
accruing over time. Discounting takes account of the fact that 
resources (goods or services) that are available in a given year are 
worth more than the identical resources available in a later year. One 
reason for this is that resources can be invested so as to return more 
resources later. In addition, people tend to be impatient and to prefer 
earlier consumption over later consumption. 
(a) Basic considerations. Constant-dollar benefits and costs 
must be discounted to present values before benefits and costs in 
different years can be added together to determine overall net 
benefits. To obtain constant dollar estimates, benefit and cost streams 
in nominal dollars should be adjusted to correct for inflation. The 
basic guidance on discount rates for regulatory and other analyses is 
provided in OMB Circular A-94. The discount rate specified in that 
guidance is intended to be an approximation of the opportunity cost of 
capital, which is the before-tax rate of return to incremental private 
investment. The Circular A-94 rate, which was revised in 1992 based 
on an extensive review and public comment, reflects the rates of 
return on low yielding forms of capital, such as housing, as well as the 
higher rates of returns yielded by corporate capital. This average rate 
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currently is estimated to be 7 percent in real terms (i.e., after adjusting 
for inflation) . . . .  
Even those benefits and costs that are hard to quantify in monetary 
terms should be discounted. ; . .  
, (b) Additional considerations. Modern research in economic 
theory has established a preferred model for discounting, sometimes 
referred to as the shadow price approach. The basic concept is that 
economic welfare is ultimately determined by consumption; 
inve.stment affects welfare only to the extent that it affects current and 
future consumption. Thus, any effect that a government program has 
on public or private investment must be converted to an associated 
stream of effects on consumption before being discounted. 
Converting investment-related benefits and costs to their 
consumption-equivalents as required by this approach involves 
calculating the "shadow price of capital." This shadow price reflects 
the present value of the future changes in consumption arising from a 
marginal change in investment, using the consumption rate of interest 
(also termed the rate of time preference) as the discount rate . . . .  
4. Treatment of Risk and Uncertainty . . . .  Often risks, benefits, and 
costs are measured imperfectly because key parameters are not known 
precisely; instead, the economic analysis must rely upon statistical 
probability distributions · for the values of parameters. Both the 
inherent lack of certainty about the consequences of a potential 
hazard (for example, the odds of contracting cancer) and the lack of 
complete knowledge about parameter values that define risk 
relationships (for example, the relationship between presence of a 
carcinogen in the food supply and the rate of absorption of the 
carcinogen) should be considered. 
(a) Risk assessment . . . .  Data relating to effects that can be 
identified may be sketchy, incomplete, or subject to measurement 
error or statistical bias. Exposures and sensitivities to risks may vary 
considerably across the affected population. These difficulties can 
lead, for example, to a range of quantitative estimates of risk in health 
and ecological risk assessments that can span several orders of 
magnitude. Uncertainties in cost estimates also can be significant, in 
particular because of lack of experience with the adjustments that 
markets can make . to reduce regulatory burdens, the difficulty of 
identifying and quantifying opportunity cost, and the potential for 
enhanced or retarded technical innovation. All of these concerns 
should be reflected in the m;icertainties about outcomes that should be 
incorporated in the analysis. 
The treatment of uncertainty in developing risk, benefit, and cost 
information also must be guided by the principles of full disclosure and 
transparency, as· with other elements of an EA. Data, models, and 
their implications for risk assessment should be identified in the risk 
characterization. . . . . · 
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In order for the EA to evaluate outcomes involving risks, risk 
assessments must provide some estimates of the probability 
distribution of risks with and without the regulation. Whenever it is 
possible to quantitatively characterize the probability distributfons, 
some estimates of central tendency (e.g., mean and median) must be 
provided in addition to ranges, variances, specified low-end and high­
end percentile estimates, and other characteristics of the distribution. 
Overall risk estimates cannot be more precise than their most 
uncertain component. Thus, risk estimates should be reported in a way 
that reflects the degree of uncertainty present in order to 'prevent 
creating a false sense of precision. The accuracy with which 
quantitative estimates are reported must be supported by the quality 
of the data and models used. In all cases, the level of precision should 
be stated explicitly. 
Overall uncertainty is typically a consequence of uncertainties 
about many different factors. Appropriate statistical techniques should 
be used to combine uncertainties about separate factors into an overall 
probability distribution for a risk. . . . 
· · 
Uncertainty may arise from a variety of fundamentally different 
sources, including lack of data, variability in populations or natural 
conditions, limitations in fundamental scientific knowledge (both 
social and natural) resulting in lack of knowledge about key 
relationships, or fundamental unpredictability of various phenomena. 
The nature of these different sources may suggest different 
approaches. For example, when uncertainty is due to lack of 
information, one policy alternative may be to defer action pending 
further study. One factor that may help determine whether further 
study is justifiable as a policy alternative is an evaluation of the 
potential benefits of the information relative to the resources needed 
to acquire it and the potential costs of delaying action. When 
uncertainty is due largely to observable variability in populations or 
natural conditions, one policy alternative may be to refine targeting, 
that is, to differentiate policies across key subgroups. Analysis of such 
policies should consider the incremental benefits of improved 
efficiency from targeting, any incremental costs of monitoring and 
enforcement, and changes in the distribution of benefits and costs . . . .  
7. Nonmonetized Benefits and Costs. Presentation of monetized 
benefits and costs is preferred where acceptable estimates are possible. 
However, monetization of some of the effects of regulations is often 
difficult if not impossible, and even the quantification of some effects 
may not be easy. Effects that carinot be fully monetized or otherwise 
quantified should be described. Those effects that can be quantified 
should be presented along with qualitative information to characterize 
effects that are not quantified. 
Irrespective of the presentation of monetized benefits and costs, 
the EA should present available physical or other quantitative 
measures of the effects of the alternative actions to help 
decisionmakers understand the full effects of alternative actions. 
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These include the magnitude, timing, and likelihood of impacts, plus 
other relevant dimensions (e.g., irreversibility and uniqueness). For 
instance, assume the effects of a water quality regulation include 
increases in fish populations and habitat over the affected stream 
segments and that it is not possible to monetize such effects. It would 
then be appropriate to describe the benefits in terms of stream miles 
of habitat improvement and increases in fish population by species (as 
well as to describe the timing and likelihood of such effects, etc.) . . . .  
8. Distributional Effects and Equity. Those who bear the costs of a 
regulation and those who enjoy its benefits often are not the same 
people. The term "distributional effects" refers to the description of 
the net effects of a regulatory alternative across the population and 
economy, divided up in various ways (e.g., income groups, race, sex, 
industrial sector). Benefits and costs of a regulation may be distributed 
unevenly over time, perhaps spanning several generations. 
Distributional effects may also arise through "transfer payments" 
arising from a regulatory action. For example, the revenue collected 
through a fee, surcharge, or tax (in excess of the cost of any service 
provided) is a transfer payments. 
Where distributive effects are thought to be important, the effects 
of various regulatory alternatives should be described quantitatively to 
the extent possible, including their magnitude, likelihood, and 
incidence of effects on particular groups. Agencies should be alert for 
situations in which regulatory alternatives result in significant changes 
in treatment or outcomes for different groups. Effects on the 
distribution of income that are transmitted through changes in market 
prices can be important, albeit sometimes difficult to assess. The EA 
should also present information on the streams of benefits and costs 
over time in order to provide a basis for judging intertemporal 
distributional consequences, particularly where intergenerational 
effects are concerned. 
There are no generally accepted principles for determining when 
one distribution of net benefits is more equitable than another. Thus, 
the EA should be careful to describe distributional effects without 
judging their fairness. These descriptions should be broad, focusing on 
large groups with small effects per capita as well as on small groups 
experiencing large effects per capita. Equity issues not related to the 
distribution of policy effects should be noted when important and 
described quantitatively to the extent feasible. 
B. Benefit Estimates 
The calculation of benefits (including benefits of risk reductions) 
should reflect the full probability distribution of potential 
consequences. For example, extreme safety or health results should be 
weighted, along with other possible outcomes, by estimates of their 
probability of occurrence based on the available evidence to estimate 
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the expected result of a. proposed regulation. To the extent possible, 
the probability distributions of benefits should be presented. Extreme 
estimates should be presented as complements to central tendency and 
other estimates.. If fundamental scientific disagreement or lack of 
knowledge precludes construction of a scientifically defensible 
probability distribution, benefits should be described under plausible 
alternative assumptions, along with a characterization of the evidence 
underlying each alternative view . . . .  
1 .  General Considerations. The concept of "opportunity ,cost" is 
the appropriate construct for valuing both benefits and costs. The 
principle of "willingness-to-pay" captures the notion of opportunity 
cost by providing an aggregate measure of what individuals are willing 
to forgo to enjoy a particular benefit. Market transactions provide the 
richest data base for estimating benefits based on willingness-to-pay, 
as long as the goods and services affected by a potential regulation are 
traded in markets. It is more · difficult to estimate benefits where 
market transactions are difficult to monitor or markets do not exist. 
Regulatory analysts in these cases need to develop appropriate proxies 
that simulate market exchange. Indeed, the analytical process of 
deriving benefit estimates by simulating markets may suggest 
alternative regulatory strategies that create such markets. 
Either willingness-to-pay (WTP) or willingness-to-accept (WT A) 
can provide an appropriate measure of benefits, depending on the 
allocation of property rights. The common preference for WTP over 
WT A measures is based on the empirical difficulties in estimating the 
latter. . . .  
2. Principles for Valuing Benefits Directly Traded in Markets. 
Ordinarily, goods and services are to be vali.ied at their market prices. 
However, in some instances, the market value of a good or service 
may not reflect its true value to society. 
If a regulatory alternative involves changes in such a good or 
service, its monetary value for purposes of benefit-cost analysis should 
be derived using an estimate of its true value to society (often called its 
"shadow price").  For example, suppose a particular air pollutant 
damages crops. One of the benefits of controlling that pollutant will be 
the value of the crop saved as a result of the controls. That value 
would typically be determined by reference to the price of the crop. If, 
however, the price of that crop is held above the unregulated market 
equilibrium price by a government price-support program, an estimate 
based on the support price would overstate the value of the benefit of 
controlling the pollutant. . . .  
In other cases, market prices could understate social values, for 
example where production of a particular good also provides 
opportunities for improving basic knowledge. 
3. Principles for Valuing Benefits That Are Indirectly Traded in 
Markets . . . .  A variety of methods have been developed for estimating 
indirectly traded benefits. Generally, these methods .apply statistical 
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techniques to distill from observable market transactions the portion 
of willingness-to-pay that can be attributed to the benefit in question. 
Examples include estimates of the value of environmental amenities 
derived from travel-cost studies, hedonic price models that measure 
differences or changes in the value of land, and statistical studies of 
occupational-risk premiums in wage rates. For all these methods, care 
is needed in designing protocols for reliably estimating benefits or in 
adapting the results of previous studies to new applications. The use of 
occupational-risk premiums can be a source of bias because the risks, 
when recognized, may be voluntarily rather than involuntarily 
assumed, and the sample of individuals upon which premium estimates 
are based may be skewed toward more risk-tolerant people. 
Contingent-valuation methods have become increasingly common 
for estimating indirectly traded benefits, but the reliance of these 
methods on hypothetical scenarios and the complexities of the goods 
being valued by this technique raise issues about its accuracy in 
estimating willingness to pay compared to methods based on (indirect) 
revealed preferences. Accordingly, value estimates derived from 
contingent-valuation studies require greater analytical care than 
studies based on observable behavior. For example, the contingent 
valuation instrument must portray a realistic choice situation for 
respondents - where the hypothetical choice situation corresponds 
closely with the policy context to which the estimates will be applied. 
The practice of contingent valuation is rapidly evolving, and agencies 
relying upon this tool for valuation should judge the reliability of their 
benefit estimates using this technique in light of advances in the state 
of the art. 
4. Principles and Methods for Valuing Goods That Are Not Traded 
Directly or Indirectly in Markets. Some types of goods, such as 
preserving environmental or cultural amenities apart from their use 
and direct enjoyment by people, are not traded directly or indirectly in 
markets. The practical obstacles to accurate measurement are similar 
to (but generally more severe than) those arising with respect to 
indirect benefits, principally because there are few or no related 
market transactions to provide data for willingness-to-pay estimates. 
For many of these goods, particularly goods providing "nonuse" 
values, contingent-valuation methods may provide the only analytical 
approaches currently available for estimating values. The absence of 
observable and replicable behavior with respect to the good in 
question, combined with the complex and often unfamiliar nature of 
the goods being valued, argues for great care in the design and 
execution of surveys, rigorous analysis of the results, and a full 
characterization of the uncertainties in the estimates to meet best 
practices in the use of this method. 
(b) Fatality risks . . . .  Reductions in fatality risks as a result of 
government action are best monetized according to the willingness-to­
pay approach. . . . Another way of expressing reductions in fatality 
risks is in terms of the "value of statistical life-years extended" 
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(VSL Y). For example, if a regulation protected individuals whose 
average remaining life expectancy was 40 years, then a risk reduction 
of one fatality would be expressed as 40 life-years extended. This 
approach allows distinctions in risk-reduction measures based on their 
effects on longevity. However, this does not automatically mean that 
regulations with greater numbers of life-years extended will be favored 
over regulations with fewer numbers of life-years extended. VSL and 
VSL Y ultimately depend on the willingness to pay for various forms of 
mortality risk reduction, not just longevity considerations. 
To value reductions in more voluntarily incurred risks (e.g., those 
related to motorcycling without a helmet) that are "high," agencies 
should consider using lower values than those applied to reductions in 
involuntary risk. When a higher-risk option is chosen voluntarily, 
those who assume the risk may be more risk-tolerant, i.e., they may 
place a relatively lower value on avoiding risks. Empirical studies of 
risk premiums in higher-risk occupations suggest that reductions in 
risks for voluntarily assumed high risk jobs (e.g., above 10-4 annually) 
are valued less than equal risk reductions for lower-risk jobs. 
However, when occupational choices are limited, the occupational 
risks incurred may be more involuntary in nature. 
C. Cost Estimates 
As with benefit estimates, the calculation of costs should reflect the 
full probability distribution of potential consequences. Extreme values 
should be weighted, along with other possible outcomes, by estimates 
of their probability of occurrence based on the available evidence to 
estimate the expected result of a proposed regulation. If fundamental 
scientific disagreement or lack of knowledge precludes construction of 
a scientifically defensible probability distribution, costs should be 
described under plausible alternative assumptions, along with a 
characterization of the evidence underlying each alternative view . . . .  
